Parliament: Waging War (Constitution Committee Report)

My Lords, this issue has been brought sharply into focus because of the commitment of our forces in 2003 into a coalition invasion of Iraq. In the distinction drawn by the inquiry, this was involvement in a ““war of choice””. I sense that the concentration of the committee and many who gave evidence to it has been, excessively, on this particular example: an outright pre-emptive assault on a sovereign nation with no clearly controlled exit strategy—a most unusual event, I hope, for the United Kingdom. It is worth looking at other examples to help in forming a view. I considered two wars of choice of which I had close experience. In the Falklands conflict, I was Vice-Chief of Air Staff, involved in staffing air aspects of the operation and attending chiefs of staff meetings to represent my chief when, on occasion, he was not available to attend. My second war of choice was the first Gulf conflict, when I was Chief of the Defence Staff and a member of the War Cabinet. I am not as confident about timely parliamentary approval as my noble and gallant friend Lord Bramall was a moment ago, but some issues about both events had great importance months, if not years, beforethe actual involvement of forces. Von Clausewitz maintained that, "““war is the continuation of politics by other means””." The political and foreign policy decisions taken by successive Governments set the scene for the Argentinian invasion of the Falklands in 1982. For example, Governments were unwilling to build a major airfield which would have made an assault on the island a far riskier operation for the Argentinians, apart from demonstrating the Government’s commitment to protecting the inhabitants. It would have been far more cost-effective to have built Mount Pleasant airfield beforehand rather than having to do so after the conflict and after considerable loss of life, equipment and treasure. The Shackleton committee of the day strongly recommended construction of an airfield. Against that background, Parliament sat on3 April 1982 to debate the crisis and to be informed of the forthcoming deployment of forces that had already been put in hand. While it was clearly an emergency situation, there was no immediate prospect of hostilities. If the proposed convention had beenin place, this could have been an opportunity for Parliament to be asked to agree to a deployment. How would it have reacted? In the circumstances, it was a matter of moral commitment as much as confidence in the outcome, if it came to conflict in the south Atlantic, that guided the Government. With the benefit of hindsight, it was indeed a close-run thing, which in no way detracts from the superlative efforts of all involved. We should also remember that through the long days and weeks before we reached the Falklands, strenuous efforts were being made on the diplomatic front. Who can forget the shuttle diplomacy of the American Secretary of State, Al Haig? With the convention approach, it might have been reasonable for Parliament to have taken the view that diplomacy should be given its head before we embarked on the hazardous voyage south, although the Government would surely have pointed out that the massive deployment showed our determination—important in trying to persuade the Argentinian Government to withdraw without a fight. The views of the doubters about the validity of such an operation—8,000 miles away in the far southern ocean; 4,000 miles between the Falklands and Ascension Island, which had the nearest airfield that we could use; appalling weather; an opposed landing, with three, four or more to one manpower advantage for the Argentinians—might have led to a different conclusion about going ahead, and a less satisfactory outcome would have been achieved. In the first Gulf War, once again there was an immediate defensive reaction with fighter aircraft and the positioning of naval vessels, and months of diplomacy. A later deployment of ground and offensive air forces had to be massively increased when it was realised that the diplomatic efforts were not going to work and that offensive action would be required. As in the Falklands, the strategic mission was clear—to boot the Iraqis out of Kuwait and deplete the strength of their Republican Guard formations to ensure that they would not form a renewed threat to Kuwait when we and coalition allies withdrew. However, I can recall pointing out to Ministers that the preferred operational manoeuvre, following the initial air assault, would be a left hook through Iraq. This would be the optimum way to achieve the stated objective. But we would be invading Iraq to do so—something, Suez apart, that we had not donefor a very long time and was not, I think, totally consistent with the United Nations charter. How would a convention-prescribed Parliament have reacted? The emergency deployment of defensive forces to protect, with its agreement, Saudi Arabia would have probably had overwhelming support. So, too, would the many diplomatic moves in hand. But would it have been so straightforward to deal with the two significant increases in our commitment of forces? The first was as much to put further political pressure on Saddam Hussein but it was not deemed by the US theatre commander, General Schwarzkopf, to be adequate to achieve military success, so a further coalition effort, including a British brigade and other forces, was dispatched. Some might call this mission creep. The Government spent much time with Statements and so forth to advise Parliament and the country what was afoot. But if parliamentarians had been invited by the Government to approve two further enhancements, building up from an initially defensive posture, through threat of action, to a determination to mount attacks into Iraq itself by air and ground forces, the timing of our deployments could have been delayed, as they nearly were because of the Conservative leadership crisis that overlapped with the Cabinet decision about the further increase in our commitment. Unlike the latest conflict in Iraq, when the decision to attack Iraq—if not its announcement—had been taken some time before hostilities began, my two examples underline the parallel running of diplomacy to settle the problem without conflict, and the truism of von Clausewitz’s dictum. Of course, there were also diplomatic efforts ahead of the second invasion of Iraq. But the specific issue of regime change and all that that meant in the aftermath of initial hostilities in order to reach that objective, added a further complication which was not present in my earlier examples. Indeed, in the first Gulf War, we were committed to leaving Iraq and only a residual force in theatre once the objectives were met. In deliberation about a convention, the complexities and interweaving strands of foreign and defence policy, and the continuous impact of the one on the other, have yet to be fully explored. Nor has much thought been given to the issue of being part of a coalition and the grand strategy of the Government which may underpin their intention to deploy. One other aspect of the convention may also have to be considered; whether the obverse of deploying forces for operations overseas—their withdrawal—would be a matter for Parliament to direct even against the wishes of the Government of the day. I cite that as a further complication. We saw a telling example of that only last week when Congress decided that it wanted US forces withdrawn from Iraq. It would seem illogical for those who support the convention of parliamentary approval for initial deployment overseas or later increases to them not to seek a responsibility to require a Government to bring home forces that Parliament felt were no longer serving the national interest. The Armed Forces are structured around the concepts of command and duty. It is in their natureto accept direction and to respond to executive authority, clearly stated and unambiguous. Parliament, as remarked on by a number of witnesses to the inquiry, does not have executive powers, and to bring it into in the decision-making process could risk damaging the clarity of the message that the forces must receive and expect. Little thought has so far been given to what I might call the law of unintended consequences if a convention were adopted. What about clarity if there is only a small majority in Parliament or even a hung Parliament? What effect would the inevitable media briefings, comment and political spin in the run-up to a convention decision have on the forces themselves? Their role is to respond to executive authority, not to the mixed views of a parliamentary debate. What if Parliament rejected deployment? Would the PM resign? He has no power of veto as does the President of the United States. We would be seen to abandon our coalition allies at a critical moment, our foreign policy in tatters. We would be lampooned around the world for a loss of nerve and a full blown political and national crisis would erupt. Therefore, I am fully behind the Government stance and hope, on further reflection, that Opposition parties will be as well. I reject the convention approach in this case as inappropriate.