Parliament: Waging War (Constitution Committee Report)

My Lords, I, too, support the Constitution Committee’s conclusions, which advocate the constitutional involvement of Parliament in any national decision to wage war overseas. I use the term ““war”” in its established and generally recognisedsense, which has legal connotations nationally and internationally. War generally and usually embraces a conflict between states with a clearly defined enemy and sizeable forces operating in accordance with a clear political aim and towards a planned, successful—one hopes—and, as the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Ripon and Leeds said, just conclusion. With or without a formal declaration, the term should cover any expeditionary-type operations into the territoryof another state. Today the terminology has become confused by those who, for whatever reason, coined the phrase ““war on terror””. Whatever we should do to contain and reduce the threats from international terrorism—and there is much we can do, sometimes involving military forces in one form or another—it is not war in the accepted sense and in the sense covered by the committee’s report any more than is a war on crime or war on drugs, both phrases not infrequently used. It has to be hoped that war has never been entered into lightly by this country, except, perhaps, in the era of Lord Palmerston, the pugilist. In Her Majesty Queen Victoria's day, the royal prerogative may have meant what it implies, with the Queen imposing some restraint on the Executive or perhaps, if General Gordon was getting into trouble in Khartoum, advising in the reverse direction. But today, as is well known, given the way that our democracy has developed, the responsibility for deciding whether the country goes to war lies squarely with the Prime Minister, however much he may sensibly keep Parliament informed. In the past, it was said—by George Clemenceau, I think—that war was too serious a business to leave to military men. The report implies—I entirely agree—that today, waging war is too complicated, sensitive and serious, politically and legally, nationally and internationally, and with the increased power of the media, to be left exclusively to the whims, vision and personal ambition of one politician, however well intentioned. I say that not so much as a personal criticism but because the character of war has changed so radically that, except under very precise circumstances, the moral, economic and public-opinion pressures and constraints have made interstate wars for advanced nations virtually no longer an instrument of sound rational government policy. So getting involved in them deserves, even more than it used to, the most careful checks and balances. War invariably creates more problems than it solves, especially if it cannot be brought to a successful conclusion in a very short, definable period. There are obvious exceptions which are morejust. I recall the various definitions of a just war.They include self-defence; the defence of sovereign territories, individual or grouped in specific defence organisations; the recovery and repossession of such territories illegally occupied by another power; or any operations specifically authorised by the Security Council or under a UN mandate. In such operations, and in any other case that the Executive consider appropriate and in the national interest, it can no longer be sufficient for a presidential-style prime minister who can call on all the wiles, Whips and devices of a majority party leader, votes of confidence and the manipulative release of information and intelligence merely to keep Parliament informed, so that it cannot threaten his decision-making. If such a decision is to be truly in the national interest with the country manifestly behind it, approval on the deployment of British forces outside the UK for actual or potential armed conflict amounting to war must, I suggest, be given by Parliament and no one else. That need not involve compromising intelligence sources. Under no circumstances must parliamentary approval be allowed to enter the tactical field: deciding on and endorsing the forces to be used and how they should be employed, which is entirely a matter under the war Cabinet for the chiefs of staff and chain of command. However, in seeking parliamentary approval, the Government should, as the report concludes, show the deployment’s political objectives, the legal basis of the deployment and subsequent conflict, if that becomes necessary, and the anticipated duration of both the operation and consolidation phases. For instance, in the Falklands War, which falls into the category I mentioned, Parliament would have had no difficulty in approving the sailing of the task force to the south Atlantic to project our commitment and power and the use of force to repossess the islands,if that proved necessary. Nor in the first Gulf War would Parliament have had any difficulty in approving the co-operation of British forces with the Americans and other allies to kick Saddam Hussein out of the illegally occupied Kuwait using whatever force became necessary. If, as the report concludes, a government resolution seeking approval is laid before Parliament with clarity—which is at the essence of any successful planning and execution, and its absence is at theheart of any failure—and honesty, Parliament, on its mettle, should have no difficulty in acting quickly, responsibly and in the national interest. If thereis confusion about aims and legality, and a Prime Minister cannot make a convincing case to Parliament, it may judge it not to be in the national interest to proceed any further. One of the problems with Iraq was that so many different aims—at least five, to my mind—were at one time or another being flaunted, discarded or picked up again, depending on the type of presentation or what the audience demanded at the time. It was so easy to get the impression that the country was being misled. Yet, with the Prime Minister in the driving seat, with all the machinery for control and manipulation behind him, Parliament was convinced and gave approval to the decision which the Prime Minister sought. With that approval went immediately the openness of popular backing and some sort of legal basis—at least, the law of the land, if not necessarily international law. But, had the basis and the scope of the operation been put to Parliament with sufficient clarity, it might have come to a very different conclusion. To require parliamentary approval before any deployment leading to an operation can get under way may be a little more time consuming, which is not necessarily a problem with large-scale operations, and it may run some risks. But it could prevent the Government of this country making fools of themselves, whereas full parliamentary authority would ensure that the country was manifestly behind any operation and that it had a sound legal basis, both of which are greatly beneficial to the morale, commitment, effectiveness and protection of the Armed Forces taking part. Nothing in what I have said is intended to imply that the world is getting any less dangerous or more stable or that the Armed Forces will not be required in some form in a variety of tasks to back up and reinforce our diplomacy. Some of it may be required at very short notice and involve clandestine operations, with surprise all-important if the aim is to be achieved. The release of prisoners and hostages, and the Sierra Leone operation are excellent examples. Clearly, the so-called royal prerogative that gives the Executive the right to deploy forces without parliamentary approval, which would be informed subsequently, is still required for operations of limited size where urgency and surprise are essential. This could be constitutionally linked to the deployment of Special Forces and, perhaps, the Royal Marines, rather like the American president’s powers are restricted to the deployment, without Congress approval, of the Marine Corps. Of course, it will have to be carefully worked out exactly how parliamentary approval is to be sought, on what terms, whether it would be under a statute or a convention and what machinery Parliament would use to consider the request. But the principle thatwar on a significant scale should be a matter for Parliament, not for the unfettered or today’s scarcely fettered Executive, is very important. I hope that your Lordships’ House will consider it with favour and be prepared to endorse the report.