Parliament: Waging War (Constitution Committee Report)

My Lords, all the members of the Select Committee owe a sincere debt of gratitude to our chairman. The inquiry was such an utterly fascinating experience that the temptation to wander down side tracks was difficult to resist at times. The noble Lord, in an unfailingly calm and courteous manner, skilfully guided us back to the matters in hand. Perhaps it was because we had such a fascinating experience and a raft of truly stimulating and hugely well informed witnesses, some of whom have already been quoted by the noble Lord, Lord Judd, that I expected an appreciative and constructive response from the Government. The work programme was enormous and the quality of support from both our specialist adviser and the Committee Clerk was awesome. It seems that, other than giving a cursory nod in the direction of accepting that the issue is important, the Government have metaphorically thrown the report into the waste basket. I read and reread the Government’s response—not an arduous task as, apart from a reiteration of the terms of reference of the Constitution Committee, there are 44 lines of type—and I am struck by its innate and inane superficiality. In my contribution to the debate, I will concentrate mainly on Chapter 3 of the report, which is headed, ““Parliamentary involvement: The balance of argument””. However, before doing so, I draw the attention of the House to the Government’s response in paragraph 4, which makes it clear that the Government are not presently persuaded of the case for establishing a new convention determining the role of Parliament in the deployment of our Armed Forces. They state: "““The existing legal and constitutional convention is that it must be the Government which takes the decision in accordance with its own assessment of the position. That is one of the key responsibilities for which it has been elected””." Does that not smack of arrogance? In effect, the response could be described as, ““We know best and do not intend to consult””. There is not even a nod in the direction of considering one of our conclusions, in paragraph 100, to the effect that there is an anxiety to ensure as far as possible that the action to use military force in pursuit of policy, "““is not only legal but legitimate and is seen to command the support of the nation as a whole””." Another conclusion, in paragraph 103, states: "““Parliament’s ability to challenge the executive must be protected and strengthened. There is a need to set out more precisely the extent of the Government’s deployment powers, and the role Parliament can—and should—play in their exercise””." The statement in the Government response is: "““That is one of the key responsibilities for which it””—" the Government— "““has been elected””." That ignores totally the methods by which the Government discharge this responsibility. If we take this attitude to its logical conclusion, the Government need not consider any views on policy formation other than those discussed with a tight-knit group in a superficial manner on the sofa. Doubtless the Ministers involved would have had detailed advice and opinions from the defence staff. But are the Government so experienced in military matters and so aware of the structure, nature and ethos of our Armed Forces that they believe that they can arrive at the correct decision without debate or discussion in Parliament? There is no merit in holding as a virtue the ability, "““to take decisions flexibly and quickly””—" that is from paragraph 5 of the Government’s response—if the decision-making is flawed, with no input from a Parliament that, let us not forget, represents the public. The tone of the whole response makes me smile wryly, bearing in mind that the Government keep asserting that the House of Lords has no legitimacy because it does not represent the people. The Government’s response does not even nod in the direction of being representative of the people. The Select Committee report makes interesting yet easy reading, and I commend it to noble Lords. More than that, as we are rapidly moving to a situation where most Members of both Houses will have had no hands-on experience of the armed services, it is vital that we read and understand their role and objectives. The evidence of the giants of the defence staff is so important, and I am glad to see some of them here today. Their emphasis on morale is vital. The report should be on the required reading list of all in Parliament. Chapter 3, which is headed ““Parliamentary involvement: The balance of argument””, is the core of the report. The noble Lord, Lord Lester, whom I see in his place, considered it anomalous for the Crownto be able to exercise public powers without parliamentary authority on the basis of medieval notions of kingship and through Crown Ministers. The European situation was referred to, where the principle of law in most constitutions means that there has to be specific authorisation to exercise powers. Nobody needs reminding that going to war involves potential loss of life and serious national consequences. Surely such a decision should be discussed and approved by Parliament. My noble and learned friend Lord Mayhew said in evidence: "““I do not think today that it is practicable to suppose that the public will be satisfied in terms of confidence in the commitment of our Armed Forces to what we might call an ‘armed conflict’ situation solely on the exercise of the prerogative by the Prime Minister””." Too much power in very few hands—or even in one pair of hands—is not acceptable in any democracy. We pride ourselves on being a democratic country, but the accretion of power and its possession in fewer and fewer hands is both unhealthy and seriously worrying. As is pointed out in the report, the Government of the day controls the House of Commons through parliamentary majorities, the finances of the nation, the use of Whips to manipulate business, the timetable of parliamentary business, plus the exercise of the royal prerogative. Paragraph 40 of the report says that, "““it could be said that the ability of United Kingdom governments to use the royal prerogative power to engage in conflict is paradoxically less democratic than when the Monarch exercised the power personally””." Can this be right? Managing dissemination of information is a tool of power, probably the most pernicious one. Time and time again we recognise that information is power, and there is a natural reluctance to relinquish any power as, obviously, power is finite and any power given away is a reduction in the power of the giver. That truth applies in every walk of life, and the Government are more aware of it than most. Where there is a perception—I emphasise ““perception””—that a situation of unfettered power persists, it is imperative that there should be a robust system of accountability, otherwise the position becomes untenable, and is certainly undemocratic. The tendency to equate accountability with regular information updates seems to be growing, but that raises another problem. As the noble Lord, Lord Garden, said in evidence: "““When we keep on saying Parliament is informed, we all know how Parliament is informed: we get a statement, if we are lucky we get it ten minutes before it is given and we debate it for under an hour. That does not seem to me to be a democratic process””." The noble Lord is right. We might well ask what category of information is presented. Is it minimum, sufficient, complete or even—if anyone can define the word—reasonable? The more we consider this whole subject, the more we are likely to conclude that the current process leaves a lot to be desired. Using war-making powers is probably the most serious decision that any country has to take, for all the reasons already referred to and likely to be referred to in the debate. Yet listening to, questioning and reading the evidence with which we were presented gave me an uneasy feeling that the very manner in which decisions are taken leaves them fraught with much more risk than could necessarily be the case. On the basis of my experience—it is nothing at all to do with government or the Armed Forces—I truly believe that most large and even small corporate organisations engaged in business and commerce adopt a much more rigorous approach, consult more widely and have access to more varied expertise from a raft of advisers than appears to be involved in the exercise of the royal prerogative in the case of war-making powers. The case for post-deployment scrutiny was well made by my noble friend Lord King of Bridgwater when he was a witness. Again, I draw an analogy with the corporate sector, where most successful companies adopt a continuous post-audit programme. My observations in this debate have led me to just one conclusion: namely, that it is in the best interests of the country, our Armed Forces and our international relationships, and that there is more chance of the right decisions being taken, if Parliament is given a proper role in challenging the Executive in this most serious exercise of war-making powers.