Statistics and Registration Service Bill

This has been a fascinating debate. It began with a proposal from the Opposition of an alternate model for the system, and it is for them to defend their model. So when the noble Lord, Lord Newby, asks me where Parliament fits into this model and whether it would be in order to table amendments on how to instruct Parliament, that question should be addressed not to me but to the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, who proposed the amendment. I say only that in legislation we should be somewhat wary of purporting to tell Parliament how it should carry out its scrutiny functions, and I am mindful that significant contributions on this issue in the other place identified support for the government model and not for the one proposed in this group of amendments. These amendments were considered in the other place but, before I address them head on, I should perhaps explain the Government’s model proposed in the Bill and say why we think that it is the right one and why the amendments and proposed new clauses would confuse the situation. However, several Members of the Committee, including my noble friends Lord Barnett and Lord Desai, and the noble Lord, Lord Turnbull, to whom I shall refer in a moment when we get on to the subject of financing the proposal, have already indicated why the alternate model proposed in the amendments has, to put it at its mildest, some imperfections. The amendments propose an alternative model and suggest how things should be done, but we in government base our position on the concept that statistical production is an executive function and that statistics are a public good serving a wide range of users. It is therefore proper that that function should be located within government rather than within Parliament. At the same time, I accept the strong argument that there has to be adequate parliamentary scrutiny of statistics in order to enhance the nation’s trust in them. The view that the production of statistics should be an executive function was supported in our public consultation, and the Treasury Select Committee, which has had responsibility for statistics in the past, largely endorsed the Government’s position. It isan almost universal feature of statistical systems internationally that statistical production sits in the Executive, not the legislature. The noble Baroness may be able to produce illustrations of where her model obtains elsewhere, but I did not notice her refer to them in her speech, nor in any other that we have heard in the past. So the model being articulated on the other side of the House certainly has some unique and, we believe, flawed features. One central pillar of the Government’s model is the production of statistics as a responsibility of government. The next core aspect of our model is scrutiny of the statistical system by an independent board, with statutory powers established in legislation, as this Bill sets out. Parliament’s role in this model is, of course, important and is to hold the statistical system and all those involved in and responsible for it to account. Parliament rightly has that role in relation to other executive functions of government which are devolved or overseen by independent boards, such as the Food Standards Agency. Therefore, the idea of a commission for official statistics established in statute, composed of Members of both Houses of Parliament and with a role in appointments, would surely confuse Parliament’s role and the governance model overall, which is the burden of the representation of my noble friend Lord Desai. Although there are a limited number of other areas where there are commissions of the type proposed—for example, the Public Accounts Commission, which scrutinises the work of the National Audit Office, and the Speaker’s Committee, which oversees the work of the Electoral Commission—they relate to the scrutiny of fundamentally different organisations and issues. Those two bodies relate to the role of the legislature, and that factor is not relevant here. The Public Accounts Commission’s primary role is to examine the National Audit Office estimates and it is established in a manner akin to the proposed commission for official statistics. The role of the National Audit Office is quite different from that of the statistical system. The National Audit Office has a particular role in ensuring that government departments have achieved value for the money voted to them by Parliament—hence the particular method of scrutiny. Equally, the Speaker’s Committee, which scrutinises the expenditure and income of the Electoral Commission, is so established because of the special role that the Electoral Commission plays in relation to the legislature. The Electoral Commission is there to establish the integrity and effectiveness of elections to this Parliament as a whole, not just to the Executive. Therefore, those two models are different and have different scrutinising structures in Parliament because of their uniqueness in those terms. I maintain that statistics do not fit within that pattern. The amendments stipulate that the Queen, in appointing the chair of the board and the National Statistician, is advised by the chair of the Commission for Official Statistics. Notwithstanding what I have already said about the reasons why I do not think we should establish a commission for official statistics, as my honourable friend the Financial Secretary set out in the other place, the Government intend to follow the usual process in these matters. That means that, in the case of Crown appointments, the Queen is advised by the Privy Council, via the Prime Minister or the Lord Chancellor. In this case, it will be the Prime Minister. That is a well established process, which it is unnecessary to stipulate in the legislation because we are accustomed, in a range of bodies, to following exactly that pattern. There is no such reference, for example, in relation to Crown appointments in the Bank of England Act. Of course, we need to guarantee that the selection process as regards the board is open and fair and conducted in line with the high standards that will be expected of the office. That aside, we do not think that the chair of such a commission should be the one to advise the Queen on such matters. The Government do not believe it is for Parliament to take a direct role in what we regard as an executive appointment. In fact, it seems to me that the noble Baroness in proposing her amendmenthas to recognise that it is certainly an executive appointment. The other amendments follow a similar vein, and would transfer the responsibilities for appointing non-executive members of the board, currently assigned in legislation to the Treasury, to the chair of the commission for official statistics. This is inconsistent with the fact that the board serves a function of the Executive. Parliament should not interpose on executive appointments. The Treasury Select Committee of the other place said last year that public perceptions about the independence of the board would depend more upon the actions of board members than the method of appointment. I am sure that we all recognise that that must be so. The Government certainly agree, and think that the direct involvement of Parliament in the appointments process would skew the accountability model for no gain. The quality of the board’s membership will of course be crucial in ensuring the board’s independence, credibility and ability, if necessary, to challenge government departments on the quality and integrity of their statistics. Parliament’s role will then be to hold such persons to account, as well as the Government for their appointments in such cases. On funding, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Turnbull, who indicated that there were difficulties in the model of the noble Baroness’s amendments. I am also grateful to my noble friend Lord Desai, who confirmed what must be the case. It is suggested that the five-year period created in the Bill for the funding and budgetary arrangements for the commission will not necessarily guarantee independence. The noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, expressed his anxiety about that. I thought, as my noble friend Lord Desai indicated, that British universities worked on exactly that model for several decades. They did so, justifiably to trumpet across the world that they had state funding but were independent of the state. They gloried in that role and stressed that it was essential that such independence should be maintained. A model not dissimilar to that is being proposed for this board, and it is suggested that the board will be under the Treasury’s thumb. I do not believe that to be so. It is not our intention, which is why have put forward this structure. It obtains for one or two other significant bodies such as the Food Standards Agency or the regulating agencies, which must have their independence from government in dealing with aspects of the utilities. All have guaranteed funding over a period to ensure their independence.