Serious Crime Bill [HL]

moved Amendment No. 104A: 104A: Clause 61 , page 32, line 37, at end insert ““; or (c) is personal data, within the meaning of section 1 of the Data Protection Act 1998 (c. 29), pertaining to a person who the public authority does not suspect of involvement in fraud.”” The noble Baroness said: I shall also speak to Amendments Nos. 111A and 112A. These again are probing amendments. They would authorise the sharing of personal data only if those data pertained to a person who is suspected of involvement infraud. The amendments would place no additional restrictions on the sharing of non-personal data. They also aim to ensure that the Audit Commission’s power to require a body to disclose information does not displace any restrictions on the disclosure of information under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 and the Data Protection Act 1998. This is a recurring theme in our debates. In fact in almost every part of new legislation we are concerned about the Government’s aim to enable a more permissive regime for data sharing. My noble friend Lord Northesk, who I am relieved to see in his place, quite rightly said during a debate on the Identity Cards Bill that, "““the statute book is groaning under the weight of successive legislation aimed essentially at creating a more permissive regime for data sharing””.—[Official Report, 14/12/05; col. 1351.]" Identity cards, DNA databases, and the children’s data sharing index are but a few examples. Data sharing of various types is proposed in the current Digital Switchover (Disclosure of Information) Bill. It is reflected in the provisions of the Offender Management Bill, which is to reach us very shortly, and of the Welfare Reform Bill. Members of this House have always questioned why there is a need for such wide-ranging, all encompassing exchanges of information. Among others, Liberty is concerned that the information is being collected because it just might be of use at a future point or because, with the recent technological advances, by looking at the information the state might, not would, find that we have done something wrong. It all too neatly fits with an urge that we think the Government have to say that one is guilty until proven innocent. Collecting personal data in this way is treating us as suspects rather than as citizens. At Second Reading, the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, who I am relieved to see in his place after a short diversion, likened these data-sharing and data-mining powers to, "““a high-tech version of the writ of assistance””," because it, "““is not necessary for there to be evidence of wrongdoing, a probable cause or a warrant based on reasonable suspicion””.—[Official Report, 7/2/07; cols. 738-39.]" We have always argued that any use of data needs to be both justified and proportionate. However, we also have to consider whether infringing the privacy of millions of people on the chance that a few cases of fraud will be identified is proportionate in respect of the Human Rights Act. I know that the Minister has said that it is compliant and that there is no problem. We have yet to be persuaded. We are not saying that personal data should never be shared or searched to identify fraud. There is a strong case that the provisions of the Data Protection Act and Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as set out in Schedule 1 to the Human Rights Act 1998, provide a flexible and reasonable legal framework that already permits private information to be used to combat crime. Liberty, which has briefed noble Lords on this point, argues that this should not be done on an indiscriminate basis but in a limited way. The Minister has stated that she envisages data being shared in a narrow and targeted way. We wonder why the Government then feel that the current provisions are not adequate. I beg to move.