Fraud (Trials without a Jury) Bill

My Lords, the service of any one of us to sit on a jury, as is now required, is an act of citizenship. The jury trial most democratically embraces another aspect of citizenship—the right to be tried by your peers. The two—being a juror and being tried by a jury—therefore fulfil two basic elements of being a citizen: the duty to perform a duty and the responsibility that that entails, and the right to have rights to be tried by a jury. I regard that as not legal, although in its context, in essence, it is a democratic feature of our democracy. If this is an appropriate act of citizenship, I remind those on my Benches that the work that was put in to achieving the working man’s suffrage was subsequently followed by the abolition of special juries and the right of every voting man and woman to sit on a jury. It was thought to be that fundamental. Any change to this democratic issue should be tested democratically. One should always be prepared to test a principle, no matter how firmly held, by its practicality. This Bill tests the principle of jury trial by its practicality in serious fraud cases. It does so by setting out conditions. In the fifth volume of thesix volumes of legislation for 2003, Section 43 ofthe Criminal Justice Act provides conditions, which the Bill does not rehearse again but which still apply.The condition for a trial without a jury is that the complexity of it or its length is likely to make it so burdensome to a jury that the interests of justice require a trial by a judge alone. Before a judge so decides, he must have regard in Section 43(6) to, "““any steps which might reasonably be taken””," to make the trial less complex and shorter. Those principles still apply, and I propose to test them against the Bill. Complexity means intelligibility of the evidence, not only by a jury but by the people who present it. Whether they are the police or the Serious Fraud Office, it is their duty to make a criminal charge and its supporting elements intelligible. I simply do not accept that because we are in the 21st century fraud and dishonesty have become so complex that they are no longer intelligible to the ordinary person. In the very first fraud case in which I was led as a junior, the opening by the prosecuting silk was something like this, ““This case is about a lot of money””. He pointed to the people in the dock. ““It belonged to their company, and it is all gone. It is gone because of their dishonesty. Over the next few days, we are going to find out what they did with it””. He then called the first witness. Am I to be told that that did not explain to the jury the three elements of any such fraud case—participation, knowledge and dishonesty—each of which is capable of being judged by any ordinary citizen, provided the material is presented intelligibly? It would be a sad moment if, as some think, the implosion of the Serious Fraud Office was accompanied by this fundamental constitutional change. Let us see the fraud prosecution system working effectively first to make things more intelligible and therefore less complex. On length, I unashamedly invite the House to note that our friend and ally the United States took on what it thought to be our best values, one of which was the jury trial. It has never ever given up on that value and on its importance in society. If American citizens were listening to our debate, they simply would not understand it. ““Why are you proposing to conduct a serious fraud case without a jury?”” they would ask. ““Because it takes too long””. ““Why does it take too long””? ““Because that is our system””. ““Why is it your system””? ““Because it has always been like that””. That is a weak and illogical basis for doing away with a serious principle. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, was quite right to point out significant change: the as-yet-untested effect of the Fraud Act; simplicity of the offence; the growing effect of complex trial protocols; new ways of doing things; shortening matters; introducing technical evidence in an attractive way; and time-limiting us lawyers. On the last of these, why not? I once heard a prosecutor being told by a judge in a New York trial concerning a fraud about letters of credit that, with five defendants, he had 30 minutes to close the three-week trial to the jury. He dealt with the first defendant as follows. He explained in a about minute the man’s defence, then looked at the jury and said, ““If any of you guys believe that, meet me after court because I am going to sell you the Brooklyn Bridge””. He then moved on to the second defendant. Are the Government really saying that the complexity and length of trials involving dishonesty mean that they are not capable of being judged by the ordinary folk of this country? Everybody knows dishonesty when they see it. The questions are not as complex and long as we claim they ought to be. It is a disgrace that any trial should take more than three months. That the six that we heard of took more than a year is unbelievable and unjustifiable. I looked up what our party’s manifesto of 2005 said on this issue. It stated: "““We will overhaul the laws on fraud””—" that has been done— "““and the way that fraud trials are conducted to update them for the 21st century and make them quicker and more effective””." I invite my noble and learned friend the Attorney-General to explain to us in his closing remarks how this Bill will make trials quicker and more effective; in other words, more intelligible and shorter. I have seen nothing in the Bill, nor heard anything said, that shows that objective being achieved in this legislative context. Even in this modernising 21st century, we should not forget the basics. There is nothing more basic than to sit in a court room and watch one citizen being judged by other citizens. It is absolutely essential. We do away with it at our peril, and we certainly do not do away with it without compelling evidence that it is necessary.