Justice and Security (Northern Ireland) Bill

moved Amendment No. 22: 22: Clause 14 , page 12, line 47, leave out from beginning to end of line 2 on page 13 The noble Baroness said: Clause 14 severely limits the capacity of the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission to investigate anything connected with national security. The proposed new Section 69B takes no real account of the particular circumstances of Northern Ireland as a society emerging from a prolonged conflict in which human rights issues frequently arose in relation to the activities of the intelligence services and of the police in relation to national security matters. Northern Ireland has been through terrible times. New Section 69B seems not to recognise those particular circumstances. Many human rights issues arose then—as we have seen from the ombudsman’s report—about the police and collusion. In practice, the Bill could forbid any disclosure to the commission of any relevant information from the past, the present and the future. That simply cannot be right. At present, there is no restriction in the Northern Ireland Act 1998 on the ability of the commission to investigate national security issues. New Section 69B(5) has the effect of reducing rather than enhancing the commission’s powers. It states that any investigation by the commission, whether or not it seeks to compel evidence, is prohibited from considering any matter concerning human rights in relation to the Security Service, the Secret Intelligence Service or GCHQ. It is one thing to prevent sensitive information coming into the public domain. We all accept that there will always be a necessity to protect national security, but it is entirely another thing to prevent questions ever being raised. The scope of this section places virtually every aspect of intelligence activity, whether past, present or future, beyond investigation by a statutory human rights agency. It restricts the scope of any investigation severely and forbids the commission to look into anything concerning human rights in relation to the intelligence services. It runs the risk of diminishing the commission’s credibility. How can the public feel confidence that the security services are complying with their obligations under human rights legislation? It is at the very point where national security concerns are raised that oversight must be allowed if abuse of the system is not to become an issue if the exercise of power becomes unquestioned. If it becomes unquestioned, it becomes unaccountable and most likely to be taken advantage of. If the commission cannot even consider whether the intelligence services are breaching human rights, it will not have the opportunity to have the question of what evidence it can look at adjudicated by the tribunal established under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. Bearing in mind that virtually the same provisions were made in Schedule 2 to the Equality Act 2006, the commission would still insist that the particular circumstances of Northern Ireland justified a different approach. It would also point out that the Irish Human Rights Commission did not have that limitation in its statute. Under Section 8(11) of the Human Rights Commission Act 2000, the IHRC cannot demand evidence from a person if that evidence is subject to legal professional privilege. There is, however, no mention in that Act of national security overrides. Surely a compromise would be to allow the RIPA tribunal to authorise or deny the calling of evidence, but to reject the blanket ban on investigating the intelligence services. At least questions could be asked of the intelligence services, even though there would be no obligation on them to give any answers. I beg to move.