Justice and Security (Northern Ireland) Bill

I shall speak to Amendments Nos. 4, 5, 7 and 8 in the group which are intended to tighten up the criteria that the DPP could use for issuing a certificate to conduct a trial without a jury. At the moment the bar is set very low in the Bill, so that the DPP may issue a certificate if he, "““suspects … there is a risk that the administration of justice might be impaired””." Suspicion is a low test for the Director of Public Prosecutions to employ and is much lower than a test on the balance of probabilities. Amendment No. 4 therefore raises the test from one of ““suspects”” to, "““believes, on the balance of probabilities””." This wording would ensure that the DPP must be at least 50 per cent certain that the conditions set out in the Bill are met. Again, Amendment No. 5 tightens the language used in the clause by providing that the DPP must agree that ““it is likely”” that the administration of justice would be impaired if a jury trial were to be held. Amendment No. 8 is simply a grammatical point. The purpose of these amendments is to ensure that the Government’s aim of a presumption in favour of jury trial is furthered. If the Government continue to resist the argument that the decision to hold a non-jury trial should have some form of judicial input and persist with the suggestion in the Bill that the DPP should decide on the mode of trial, then in taking that decision the DPP should have to satisfy himself that a higher threshold has been reached before he issues a certificate. This is a very wide power and by instituting a higher but realistic threshold, we believe that it would ensure confidence in the decisions on mode of trial. Amendment No. 7 again returns to an issue raised in another place on which we would like to probe the Government a little further. The term, ““the interests of justice””, is widely used in legislation, but theterm, ““the administration of justice””, is not quite so well known and thus may conjure up notions of management and something being run efficiently rather than the perhaps less tangible but none the less well understood principle of something being done for the good of justice. This form of language ties in much better with the principle of conducting a fair trial—a fair trial which is seen to be in the interests of justice rather than one being expedited quickly for the sake of time management. The term, ““the interests of justice””, is used in Section 44 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and the Minister in the other place agreed to consider the wording and write to my honourable friend the Member for Montgomeryshire on this issue. In that response the Minister stated: "““The phrase ‘interests of justice’ goes somewhat wider than ‘administration of justice’. ‘Administration’ also suggests a connection with the procedures for achieving fairness. I am keen to restrict the application of this system of non-jury trial as far as possible, so I intend to maintain the wording in the Bill””." Does the Attorney-General recognise that there could be a conflict between the interests of justice and the administration of justice? For example, it could be in the interests of justice for a jury to try a particular case, but because the defendant has a loose association with someone suspected of being at one time a member of a paramilitary organisation, the DPP may suspect that there is a small risk of jury intimidation. That would mean dismissing the jury and calling a new one to try the case or dismissing the jury and proceeding with a judge-alone trial. He decides that this process could be cumbersome and waste time and that, in the interests of expediency, he should issue a certificate now for a non-jury trial. That may be a slightly tortuous argument; nevertheless, it could happen. Does the noble and learned Lord acknowledge that such a situation could arise? Will he agree to reflect further on the wording of this part of the Bill?