Serious Crime Bill [HL]

I have to be really careful because I have about 12 excellent examples in my mind, but I regret to tell your Lordships that I understand that all of them are active cases. They would clearly indicate why we need this. I am grappling quickly to see whether I can come up with a different scenario, which would be similar to but not identical with those that are currently under review. Let me try. A scam could be run in relation to, for example, a school. People are being trafficked to this country, provision is being made for them to attend a school and they get visas on that basis, but no school exists. However, there are premises which have been secured by the Mr Big through which these people can obtain a visa. Third parties may be involved in providing PO box numbers and matters of that sort. You may wish to restrict the individual from obtaining a PO box number to facilitate that sort of fraud. You are looking at how the fraud or the criminal activity is being perpetrated and how you best disable that person from carrying out that fraud. You may therefore require a third party to notify the authorities if that individual were to obtain a PO box. That would not be a general clause but it may be a clause that the court would deem reasonable to apply in the circumstances. I will now deal with the provision of noble Lord, Lord Goodhart. I was trying to say strongly that the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, in his usual colourful way was almost saying that these orders will be made to keep people under house arrest unreasonably. I would say that each condition has to be reasonable and proportionate. I come back to my noble and learned friend Lord Morris of Aberavon. If a condition was unreasonable or oppressive, it would not be consistent with the Human Rights Act. I would be greatly surprised if the court entrusted with this role would be minded to make such an order. The court knows all too well the balance that it would have to strike on reasonableness. It is therefore incredibly important that subsection (1)(b) says that the court, "““has reasonable grounds to believe that the order would protect the public by preventing, restricting or disrupting involvement””." The person who asserted that there were such reasonable grounds would have to prove it on the balance of probabilities. As I said, it would not be a discernible and identifiable fact; it would be a matter of judgment to which the court would have to come after considering all the facts of the case. Having looked at the information provided, the court would have to make that assessment. Ultimately, as that is quite a serious assertion, if the court felt that the evidence was of insufficient weight to satisfy the court that it should make an order, an order would not be made. We were therefore very careful when crafting the provision that the lower court would not be dealing with it, as we know how complex and difficult these issues are; it really has to be the High Court, which we believe can be entrusted appropriately and consistently to carry out that balancing exercise. Importantly, to the fore of every piece of legislation is the statement on compatibility with convention rights. The court will have to craft these orders so that they are compatible with the convention rights. The orders will have to be proportionate and just and the court will have to be satisfied that it would be proper to make them. These are not executive orders made by the serious organised crime office or the Government but orders sought from the court and given by the court.