Greater London Authority Bill

But it was sufficiently whelming under the current Act and the Government’s new GLA Bill to allow the assembly not to stand in the way of the Mayor’s budget. That is especially important, given that the hon. Gentleman has mentioned the significant increase in the tax demands on residents of London. It cannot be good for democracy to elect a body with a voting role on a budget and then to turn round and say that a two-thirds majority is required for the will of that assembly or Parliament to be decisive. The reputation of the House would not be well supported if the Government’s annual budget could be voted through by 218 Members of the House. The House would have no credibility were that the case. It is a fundamental blow to the credibility of the assembly to set such a two-thirds requirement. In Committee, the response was that we should consider the London assembly to be a scrutiny body—perhaps an effective one. If we are spending £11 million a year on the London assembly, however, that is a very expensive scrutiny committee for London. When the Committee considered budgetary issues, I also proposed that we might at least consider following the model in place in New York city, of a separate budget and performance office. The London assembly could have that in place in a statutory fashion, with the statutory involvement of stakeholders, the Mayor and the GLA family functional bodies, and that would ensure at least some value for money from the £11 million a year spent on the scrutiny process. As a member of the assembly, I accept a certain amount of ““mea culpa””; perhaps it is a great failing of assembly members that we have not been able to impose that.