Human Rights

I dealt with that very question with the then Home Secretary and I think that it perhaps played some part in his ultimate removal. I challenged him specifically on the question of habeas corpus and he was in a complete muddle. He did not know what to say, because he could not tell me whether it was or was not applicable. He contradicted himself. As I said in my speech at that time, the point is that the rule of habeas corpus is the ultimate and most sacred provision available to judges in all circumstances. It overrides all other requirements of the judiciary. As Lord Steyn and a number of distinguished judges have made clear, their most sacred duty is to ensure habeas corpus. My answer to the hon. Gentleman is very simple. These rights are inherent in our system and cannot be overridden. In relation to control orders, the ““red judges””, as we call them, would in the circumstances that I envisage go in to make sure that there was no unfair treatment of alleged suspects even if we were 90 per cent. certain that they were terrorists. They must be treated properly. However, that is not the way in which the Human Rights Act operates—hence the control orders and the problems that have flown from them. Another aspect on the formulation of legislation—I am talking about the whole breadth of legislation—has to be considered carefully. A paper was produced, although I do not think that it was in the days when I was shadowing the Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs. By the way, however, I am not sure whether Lord Falconer of Thoroton is the Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs or the Lord Chancellor, and when he is which and when he is the other. The fact remains that in this paper produced in July last year, it is made crystal clear on page 20 that, in respect of the provisions for making a statement of compatibility,"““The result is that all Government Bills coming before Parliament since the Act””—" the Human Rights Act 1998—"““became law must have been through a process of careful scrutiny by officials and lawyers in order to brief the relevant Minister prior to the Minister certifying their view.””" It goes on to say:"““Questions of proportionality, and the identification of policy options that produce the least interference with Convention rights, should be embedded in the policy development process… Guidance to departments has consistently made it clear that human rights proofing is not simply an exercise to be carried out after legislation has been drafted.””" In other words, we have sold ourselves down the river lock, stock and barrel to this principle of universality contained in the European convention on human rights—and, for that matter, in the 1948 universal declaration of human rights that was passed in the United Nations. We have therefore handed over to the courts at the same time the application of the law in order to ensure that these principles set out in the paper are complied with. It is like the hunting of the snark. The plain fact is that all civil servants and every public authority are under an obligation to give effect to these principles irrespective of their practicality. No wonder all these problems have arisen, to which the Minister, my hon. Friends and the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome have referred. Misunderstandings are bound to arise from the impossibility of being able to relate these universal principles to practical circumstances. That is where the advantages of our common law system, which deals with specific cases in specific ways, are clear. The effect of the universal application of these principles has created problems for our statute law in that, although we can override it—as the case of Simms v. O’Brien and Lord Hoffmann’s judgment on the Human Rights Act 1998 made clear—the general application of the system employed and set out in this paper ensures that the whole of the human rights principles is embedded in the manner in which all Government Bills are introduced. That is where the problem lies. We no longer have regard to specific circumstances, which is one of the reasons why we get into such difficulty over the whole question of terrorism. The issue of terrorism has brought up the whole question of public security and the safety of the nation in a way that is frequently inconsistent with the universal application of these principles as set forward in the European convention on human rights, the Human Rights Act 1998 and, indeed, the United Nations human rights declaration of 1948. Indeed, I would go even further. I went back to find out about the rapporteur of the universal declaration, who turned out to be a Mr. Charles Malik, one of the great jurists of the time. He said that there were four basic principles. Amongst other things, he said:"““In my opinion, there is here involved the deepest danger of the age, namely, the extinction of the human person as such in his own individuality and ultimate inviolability, and therefore, the disappearance of real freedom of choice.””" That freedom of choice lies in our democratic system. That is what we should rely upon to guarantee, through elected representatives and through our democratic system, that we make appropriate provision for the specific circumstances and do not draw down these generalised universal principles, which then fall foul of the specific difficulties that arise from time to time. Edmund Burke understood that completely. This is where we have gone wrong. There is a very simple lesson to be learned from this debate. It is that universal declarations do not work and that we should be specific in safeguarding people’s liberties. The rights of the people are vested in this House of Commons, which is the place where decisions should be taken on behalf of the British people as a whole.