UK Parliament / Open data

West Papua

Proceeding contribution from Lord Avebury (Liberal Democrat) in the House of Lords on Monday, 8 January 2007. It occurred during Questions for short debate on West Papua.
My Lords, I am afraid that the short answer to the Question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Harries, is none, as the UK does not support the independence of West Papua and we were accomplices in its unlawful annexation by Indonesia. The right of self-determination, while undoubtedly a legal right, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Archer, pointed out, is a matter of state practice in the absence of any rules for determining how it should be enforced. Therefore, is there any point now in reviewing the events that led up to the so-called act of free choice? In the cases of Srebrenica and Rwanda, there were formal inquiries into how those appalling tragedies were allowed to happen. The Secretary-General himself took responsibility for investigating the Srebrenica massacre, in which an estimated 20,000 people were slaughtered by the Serbian militias. However, as two noble Lords have pointed out, in West Papua something like 100,000 people have been killed since the Indonesian occupation—five times as many as in Srebrenica—yet the UN has failed to review the conduct of the bogus operation carried out under its auspices that led to this enormous tragedy. When I asked the Government six years ago whether they considered that an independent audit of the UN’s role should be commissioned, the noble Baroness, Lady Scotland, said that she was satisfied that the study being conducted by the Institute of Netherlands History would serve that purpose. That report, by Professor Pieter Drooglever, was published in November 2005 and, as has already been said, it confirms that the outcome had been pre-determined by Suharto, who had issued instructions that nothing but a ruling in favour of Indonesia would be acceptable. The UN observers were allowed to see as little as possible and were ejected from the territory immediately after the so-called vote. The UN was directly responsible for what happened because it was nominally in charge from 1962, when the Dutch left, until November 1969, the date of the fraudulent act, although, as has been pointed out, from 1963 onwards the Indonesians were allowed to govern the territory. The UN returned only in August 1968 under an agreement which required it to, "““advise, assist and participate in””," the arrangements for the act of free choice, which was to be carried out, "““in accordance with international practice””." That was immediately violated by the UN itself, which failed to organise a plebiscite and, instead, agreed that the decision would be made by an assembly, whose members would be indirectly elected by an undefined electorate. As we have heard, the Indonesians chose the 1,000-odd candidates, all of whom were elected unopposed in batches, with the so-called ““voters”” browbeaten or bribed into approving them by acclamation. UN observers saw the elections of 195 of these stooges but, significantly, their report to the General Assembly was silent on the conduct of the operation. By that time, the UN team had been whittled down to a mere 16 members at the insistence of the Indonesians, and it would have been impossible for it to fulfil its remit, even with full co-operation, in a territory the size of California with only the most primitive transport and communication systems. However, members of the team did not complain when no interpreters were provided or when they had to ask permission every time they wanted to move outside the capital. They failed to blow the whistle when they saw Indonesian soldiers and officials pouring into the territory in far larger numbers than planned and exerting heavy pressure on the Papuans to choose integration and give up the dream of self-determination. That fraudulent process was endorsed by the General Assembly with the approval of the UK. The Permanent Secretary at the Foreign Office had recommended not entering into correspondence about self-determination, and in the UN we firmly supported the betrayal of the West Papuans, not on grounds of principle but out of solidarity with the Dutch and as a means of improving our relations with the military dictator General Suharto, who had done a splendid job exterminating half a million communists and was therefore a man to be encouraged. The Government may not seek to persuade the UN that there should be a rerun, as the noble Lord, Lord Harries, called it, of what happened in 1969, but they should at least seek an opportunity to get the Drooglever report upheld and endorsed by the General Assembly, and that is what I ask the Minister to agree to. In other cases where the UN has failed to uphold the rights of peoples, it has recorded and acknowledged its appalling mistakes and their tragic consequences. Will the Minister agree that the act of free choice cries out for the same treatment? More than that, should not the international community try to alleviate the suffering now being endured by West Papuans, unseen by human rights organisations, foreign journalists, the UNHCR and MPs, all of whom, as we have heard, have been refused permission to enter the territory? The EU Troika was invited in 2005 but declined because, I understand, at that time the Aceh negotiations were at a crucial stage. Will Ministers now ask the German presidency to seek a renewal of that invitation so that the present EU Troika can at least go to see what is happening in West Papua today? Unfortunately, although President Megawati made offers of special autonomy to Aceh and West Papua in 2001, there has been a complete divergence between the fortunes of the two provinces since then. In Aceh, a peace agreement was concluded in 2005 and successful elections have now been held there. Could not the lessons of that peaceful outcome be transferred to West Papua in principle—not in detail but, as has been suggested, at least by starting negotiations towards an outcome similar to that in Aceh? The present deployment of extra troops and paramilitary police is not the answer, any more than it was in Aceh. We should be saying respectfully to Indonesia that a framework is needed for negotiating a political settlement, building on the experience of Aceh, although perhaps involving not just the OPM but representatives of all the diverse communities in West Papuan society, including civil society, traditional tribal leaders, the church and the MRP. If we can ask for that, we shall be getting somewhere.
Type
Proceeding contribution
Reference
688 c98-100 
Session
2006-07
Chamber / Committee
House of Lords chamber
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