Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Bill [HL]

That was a very nice point. It almost balanced on a pinhead, if I may say so. The basic principle that we are discussing is forcible entry into domestic premises. However that is expressed—no doubt the noble Baroness can tell me in due course if I am wrong and explain precisely why—it certainly looks as though forcible entry is a power granted under the schedule. What are missing are safeguards. Safeguards are left to regulation. The law that protects domestic premises from forcible entry by bailiffs is an extremely ancient and settled law—as expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont of Whitley, in his Second Reading speech, if I recall—that an Englishman's home is his castle. For the benefit of the record, that is the same in Wales as England. Indeed, I think that we have more castles per head of population than the English. The Bill attacks a principle that is almost a constitutional right. If there is a chance of excessive use or misuse of a power of forcible entry, the safeguards should be in the Bill. Such a power can, in certain circumstances, be quite disproportionate. For example, collecting congestion charges does not really require a power of forcible entry into domestic premises. I referred to that in my Second Reading speech in a case that I know well. The amendment is intended to define the nature of the regulations to be proposed and, in particular, to require the Courts Service to prepare an information sheet to be sent out when a judgment debt is created, to inform the judgment debtor precisely of the rights and remedies available to them with regard to enforcement powers. Amendment No. 70 sets out the nature of the information to be included in those regulations. As for the power to use reasonable force, we argue that that should be allowed only under a court order. In Amendment No. 88, we set out the matters that the court should take into account in deciding whether to issue a warrant for forcible entry. To involve the court is, in our view, the right way to go about it. That is fundamental. Finally, Amendments Nos. 76, 78 and 80 deal with what is now to be called a controlled goods agreement, but which is better known as a walking possession agreement. That gives the idea of the bailiff walking in and walking out with everything that you own, but a walking possession agreement is an agreement whereby the goods remain in the premises and the bailiff indicates to the householder that they will be removed unless they reach some sort of agreement. Currently, a walking possession agreement can be signed by any responsible person on the premises, but both paragraphs 13(1)(d) and 13(4) in Schedule 12 suggest that a controlled goods agreement must be signed by the debtor. What happens if the debtor is not at home? What if the debtor is out working to try to raise the money to pay the judgment debt? We put forward the simple solution that other, defined people should be competent to sign the agreement, as with the walking possession agreement. That is the purpose of these amendments. Allowing absolutely anybody to sign the agreement could lead to abuses—for example, it would be possible to persuade children to sign such an agreement. It is necessary to define with some precision who can have this power. These amendments seek to provide a simple definition of other people who may sign. I apologise for taking so much time to introduce and explain this group. I beg to move.