Greater London Authority Bill

My hon. Friend is taking me into different territory, which is a matter of planning policy generally. I have in the past looked into this matter in considerable detail and I do not agree with the third-party right of appeal concept, which I think would be a disaster in respect of planning decisions. It would clog up a system that is already proving difficult in some respects for developers to find their way through. I cannot be tempted down that particular byway. I shall now turn from the powers to the way in which the GLA operates. The Government have come up with broadly the correct package of changes to improve the way that the GLA works without unbalancing the arrangements between the Mayor and the assembly, which were very carefully crafted when the structure was put in place. Under that architecture, the Mayor is clearly, unequivocally, in the driving seat, with executive powers, while the role of the assembly is to scrutinise, to hold the Mayor to account and to test whether the Mayor’s strategies are as effective and robust as they need to be to meet London’s needs. The proposed changes do not seek to alter that, despite the pressures applied from some quarters to extend greater executive powers to the assembly. That would be confusing, and inconsistent with the ““strong mayor”” model that is at the heart of the GLA system of governance. The proposed changes respect the overall structure, but refine the way in which it operates, and they are generally sensible, modest and incremental reforms. The Mayor will rightly be required to have regard to the assembly’s views before finalising his strategies, and he will be obliged to give reasons when rejecting assembly proposals. On staffing matters, the assembly will be empowered to hold confirmation hearings for a limited number of senior posts, but it will not be able to veto appointments. In both of those respects, the assembly’s scrutiny role is being strengthened without undermining the Mayor’s executive powers. The head of paid service will take over responsibility for appointments, in line with normal public service patterns. However, in its representations the assembly makes a valid point when questioning whether that power should extend to changes in the overall establishment without such changes being subject to scrutiny. That question should be considered in Committee. On the budget, the Bill sensibly proposes a split to identify separately the proportion of the budget attributable to the assembly, as against the proportion necessary to meet the Mayor’s requirements. The current proposals incorporate a rather complex formula to cap any increase in the budget attributable to the assembly, without any comparable mechanism to establish a floor below which the assembly’s budget cannot be reduced. The assembly perfectly reasonably thinks that that is unfair and one-sided. I understand that it believes that the current Mayor has been generous in providing for the assembly’s needs and it does not doubt that he will continue to be so, but it fears that under a different regime that might not be the case. It also argues that if it is necessary to provide safeguards against unreasonable increases in the level of the assembly budget, comparable safeguards should apply to ensure that no future Mayor could vengefully reduce the assembly’s resources to prevent effective scrutiny. With those reservations, I am happy to confirm my strong support for the proposals in the Bill, which will help the GLA continue to develop successfully and provide the effective city-wide leadership that our capital needs and deserves. I look forward to the Bill being enacted.