Debate on the Address

The hon. Gentleman makes a valid point. I was disappointed to hear that the representative from DFID had only recently returned to Helmand after several months in Kabul, because of the security situation in the south. Sitting in the room with the Afghani parliamentarians was a British soldier who was mourning the loss of a friend and colleague who had lost his life in Helmand that very day. He was angry with the questioner. To me, that was a poignant moment. It reinforced our important duty as parliamentarians not only to make considered judgments, but to follow through on the commitments that we make in the House. The US-led mission Operation Enduring Freedom was less interested in long-lasting security and reconstruction, and more concerned with tracking down Osama bin Laden—who, unless we have all forgotten, is still a free man—and with eradicating al-Qaeda. However, the NATO mission has a better ethos and better objectives, even though its success will be a test for NATO and its member nations, many of which still need to step up to the plate with significant troop numbers. The fundamental problem is that we took our eye off the ball in Afghanistan when we kicked down the door in Iraq. We desperately need an inquiry into the strategy in Iraq and what we do next. As many hon. Members have said, it is insulting for the Prime Minister to assert that holding an inquiry here would undermine the troops, when that is exactly what the Americans are doing. What makes matters worse is that he then gives evidence to the US inquiry. Apparently Britain is allowed to have its inquiry, but he is the only Member of the House who is allowed to give evidence to it. By over-committing in Iraq and Afghanistan, the armed forces are overstretched. The Minister will know that in 1997 the Government announced in the strategic defence review that Britain would be able either to mount one major operation, on the scale of the 1991 Gulf war, or to undertake a sustained lesser deployment, like the Bosnia operation in the mid-’90s, while being prepared to mount a second, relatively small operation—say, a brigade-sized operation—elsewhere. That was updated in 2002, to reflect the experience of having to do more small operations than had been planned. The problem, as both the Armed Forces Pay Review Body and the National Audit Office have said this year, is that the assumptions are always broken. For at least the past seven years, the forces have been operating at levels higher than those contained in planning assumptions, even when the assumptions were revised. That causes overstretch and also means that some equipment wears out more quickly than planned. Resources are allocated against planning assumptions. Although occasional fluctuations above the plan are to be expected, continuous over-tasking causes cumulative problems. With our current commitments in a range of locations throughout the world, there is little doubt that our forces are suffering from overuse. They have had to call on reservists to plug gaps on too many occasions, which must limit our ability to respond to unforeseen crises. I and others are concerned about the likely consequence of that overstretch. Individuals may suffer from burnout, resulting in reduced lengths of service and a reduction in the average experience levels. Such overstretch may also make the armed forces less attractive to new recruits at a time when recruitment is so important. Last Saturday, in Inverkeithing in my constituency, two former members of the armed forces came to my surgery. They were frustrated and angry about the treatment that they had received after they had left the Army a few years back. They had both suffered for years from what they now know is post-traumatic stress disorder, which had been caused by their years of service in Northern Ireland. After years of seeking support from the NHS to treat their symptoms, but without success, they eventually discovered the charity Combat Stress, which immediately identified the problem and secured the necessary care for them. They asked me why the NHS was not set up to deal with post-traumatic stress disorder among ex-members of the armed forces. Why did they not know about the charity Combat Stress? Why is it a charity rather than a fully funded part of the NHS? I hope that the Secretary of State will consider those points from my constituents in his response. I want to turn to the procurement of weapons and platforms for modern warfare. In the coming months, Rosyth is expecting a decision from the Government to proceed with the construction of two future aircraft carriers. Provisionally named HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Prince of Wales, they will each weigh 65,000 tonnes, be 265 m in length, be capable of speeds of up to 25 knots and have a hangar capacity for around 20 aircraft. The final stages of the build will be completed at Rosyth, which reflects the high regard for the yard and its work force in the industry. It has a reputation for effectiveness, efficiency and delivering on time and within budget, with which I am sure the Secretary of State will agree. Will the Secretary of State give us an update on negotiations with the future carrier alliance? When does he expect a decision? Will the Navy base review consider basing the carriers at Faslane? What role does he expect Rosyth to have in the refit? The two future aircraft carriers will be essential for modern warfare, in which we are increasingly involved in conflicts in far-flung parts of the world where we have few allies with the necessary airbase capacity. Those carriers will give us the flexibility and capacity to respond to modern threats. They will also allow us to respond in a targeted and responsible way. That cannot be said of cluster bombs.