Debate on the Address

I should like to begin by making three observations about the Prime Minister’s speech. First, together with the right hon. Member for Cardiff, South and Penarth (Alun Michael), he claimed credit for the redevelopment of Cardiff bay. The redevelopment of Cardiff bay had started and been under way for some considerable time well before 1997. It is a measure of the extent to which the Prime Minister has withdrawn into a world of fantasy that he takes credit for achievements that are not his. My second observation is about the extent to which evidence was available when the House last considered the period of detention during which terrorist suspects could be held without charge. The Prime Minister suggested that there was evidence to justify a period of 90 days, but there was no such evidence. At the time, I had some responsibility for the attitude of Her Majesty’s Opposition. I asked the Prime Minister what evidence existed and I was shown it, such as it was. There was no evidence, at that time, to justify a longer period of detention than the 28 days on which the House agreed. Since then, further evidence may have become available, but if so it has not been made available to the House. I hope that it will be made available without delay to my hon. Friend the Member for North-West Cambridgeshire (Mr. Vara), who asked for it, and to my right hon. Friends the shadow Home Secretary and the Leader of the Opposition. Thirdly, I shall respond to the Prime Minister’s suggestion that it is wrong to subject our strategy in Iraq to continuing assessment, lest we give signals that somehow give comfort to our enemies. I entirely repudiate the observations of the hon. Members for Middlesbrough (Sir Stuart Bell) and for North Durham (Mr. Jones), to the effect that the morale of our troops is undermined if we keep that strategy under review. In my judgment, nothing would do more to undermine morale than the perception that the only reassessment of the strategy is the one under way in Washington and the House lacks either the interest or the robustness necessary to make its own assessment of where we are. That leads me to the subject of Iraq and Afghanistan. I do not intend to talk about the past; I want to talk about the present and the future. Just three days ago, virtually every Member of the House attended services to commemorate the sacrifices made on our behalf in two world wars. On that same day, four more members of our armed forces made the supreme sacrifice in Iraq. So far, we have lost 125 men and women in Iraq and 41 in Afghanistan—and, alas, there are certain to be more such losses. The House has a duty to face up to the question of whether we are asking our servicemen and women to risk, and perhaps give, their lives in a cause that is not only just, but attainable. The Government’s objective in Iraq was to establish a situation in which Iraq became a prosperous, democratic and stable state—a ““beacon””, in the Prime Minister’s word, for the rest of the region. That is a noble objective, but the question that we cannot shirk is whether that is still achievable. Apparently, the Government now seek to co-opt Syria and Iran in their efforts to deal with the crisis that we face. I am all for talking to Syria and Iran, and it is a great pity that the United States, in particular, spurned the opportunity to talk to Iran before its current President came to office. By all means, let us talk to those countries, but do we really think that Syria and Iran want a democratic Iraq that is a beacon for the rest of the region? Those are the very countries to which Iraq was supposed to become a beacon. What can we offer Syria and Iran to persuade them to co-operate with us in achieving our objective? Will we tell Syria that we will try to call off the attempts to bring the Syrian Administration to account for the assassination of Rafik Hariri, the former Prime Minister of Lebanon? Will we give it the green light to resume its policy of intervention in Lebanon? What will we offer Iran—will we give it the green light to continue its nuclear programme? If there is a solution to the crisis in Iraq—I very much hope that there is—it must largely come from within Iraq. The one critical step that must be taken is to bring under proper constitutional and democratic control the armed militias that appear to be the source of so much of the lawlessness that afflicts the country at present. Indeed, there are worrying signs—as recent events make clear—that the police themselves need to be brought under proper constitutional and democratic control. As long as those armed militias continue to owe their allegiance to political parties, individual Cabinet Ministers or other leaders, and as long as they are permitted to exist, we will never reach the objective that the Prime Minister has set. I do not pretend that dealing with those militias will be an easy task—I am sure that it has become much more difficult since I first made that point more than a year ago—but unless it is addressed I am afraid that there is no hope that the Prime Minister’s objective can be achieved. This is the hardest of the hard choices that face Prime Minister al-Maliki. If he needs help to do what must be done, as he undoubtedly will, he should be given it; but if he will not, or cannot, confront the threat that the militias pose to the achievement of a prosperous and stable Iraq, we should recognise the hopelessness of the mission and act accordingly. Somewhat similar considerations apply in Afghanistan. There, as anecdotal reports abundantly demonstrate, the problem is corruption. Apparently, it is now impossible to travel along a main road in Afghanistan without being stopped at official checkpoints and asked for money. That corruption is at least one of the causes of the resurgence of the Taliban and it must be tackled by President Karzai. Again, I do not pretend that the task is easy and if he needs help he should be given it, but again if he cannot, or will not, tackle that challenge we should recognise the consequences for our mission in that country and act accordingly. One of the constant criticisms that has been made of the Prime Minister is that—to put it mildly—he has failed to make the most of the influence that he has at various times possessed with our allies, especially the United States. I believe that criticism is justified, but the Prime Minister now has a final opportunity to use whatever influence he still possesses. By virtue of the presence of our troops, that influence in Iraq and Afghanistan remains considerable. By persuading the Government of Iraq to tackle the militias and the Government of Afghanistan to tackle corruption, the Prime Minister may yet, despite all the mistakes that have been made, rescue the international missions for which he is most likely to be remembered.