Violent Crime Reduction Bill

My Lords, we had a similar debate only last week in your Lordships’ House when we discussed the Police and Justice Bill. We did not have the benefit of the historical discourse given by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, which I am sure we all found enlivening and, in its way, entertaining. I am tempted to talk about whipping, although perhaps it is inappropriate. In any case, I got the message from the noble Lord’s story to us all. The amendment seeks to re-impose automatic reporting restrictions, in the terms set out by the noble Lord, in proceedings for an order on conviction involving young people and where there is a breach of an order by a young person. As I said, we debated this last week and on several other occasions, and we on the government Benches take a very different view. In the past, I sought to explain that we are not creating a situation in which all cases would be automatically reported. Although we are reversing the presumption, we are not preventing the courts imposing reporting restrictions where appropriate. It is for the courts to make that judgment. The important point here is that communities that become involved in laying the ground for a form of social action, of which that drinking banning orders are part, need to be able to see and to understand that action is being taken on their behalf against behaviour that can blight whole neighbourhoods. In addition, we argue that the effectiveness of a drinking banning order and the ability to enforce it will frequently depend on people knowing about the order and its terms. The noble Lord talked about individuals becoming local anti-heroes and media personalities in their neighbourhood. I doubt that that is likely; it has certainly not occurred greatly where I live as a result of anti-social behaviour orders. The publicity surrounding those orders has, in most instances that I can judge, been beneficial, because people have felt that at last the courts are doing something that represents their side of the argument. Of course it is possible that the knowledge distributed about someone’s behaviour may make them reflect more on that behaviour, which in itself is no bad thing. It may well make young people think of the possible longer-term consequences for their employability and for their set of friendships and social relations. Anti-social behaviour orders have certainly had some value. A test case in the London borough of Brent—R (on application of Stanley, Marshall and Kelly) v the Metropolitan Police Commissioner—upheld the principle that publicity is necessary to help to enforce an order. It recognised that, by informing local people of the prohibitions imposed by the order, they could identify and report breaches to the police. We recognise, however, that any publicity must be necessary and proportionate to the identified aims and impact of the order. In some circumstances, particularly where publicans and local people need to know and understand to whom an order applies, there will be value in publicity. I come back to the point that we do not want to undermine the effectiveness of drinking banning orders by accepting the amendments. Accepting them would have an adverse impact on our policy objectives. The noble Lord takes a different view, to which he is entitled, but I urge him to reconsider his position for the sake of the effectiveness and completeness of the policy that we are working through in the legislation and to withdraw his amendment. I cannot see that those amendments have merit. Where courts think that it would be inappropriate, they are of course entitled to take the view that publicity given to drinking banning orders for young people is wrong, inappropriate or unnecessary, and are at liberty to follow their own judgments.