Violent Crime Reduction Bill

moved AmendmentNo. 1: Page 1, line 10, leave out ““or disorderly”” The noble Lord said: My Lords, to the select few who remain, I hope to be forgiven if I remind your Lordships of something of the background to drinking banning orders and the basic objection in principle we have to them in the way they are expressed in the Bill. We recognise that there is a problem with excessive drinking in this country, particularly among young people. However, the drinking banning orders use the machinery of the ASBO. The ASBO is something we have objected to throughout. The drinking banning order is an application to the court—either a magistrates’ court or a county court—by the police or a local authority to obtain an order against an individual whose conduct is disapproved of. The order imposes, "““any prohibition on the subject which is necessary for the purpose of protecting other persons””." A civil order is being obtained and therefore the rules that appertain to civil proceedings, in particular the procedures of the court, are not as stringent as they are where criminal charges are concerned. It is possible to obtain such an order entirely on hearsay evidence—the tittle-tattle of the neighbourhood, as it were. It is also possible to obtain that order not because the offensive behaviour is proved beyond reasonable doubt—the ordinary standard in a criminal case—but simply on a balance of probabilities that the behaviour complained of has been established more rather than less. If it is breached in any way, the drinking banning order can be followed by criminal proceedings in the ordinary sense. A breach of a banning order will result in a fine. If that fine is not paid, as sometimes will be the case with people with a drink problem, it can be followed by imprisonment. The amendment to which I speak seeks to put at least some curb upon the making of these orders. At the moment the orders can be made, "““for the purpose of protecting other persons from criminal or disorderly conduct””." We are all familiar—some may be more familiar than others—with the normal criminal charge of being drunk and disorderly, but this is ““criminal or disorderly””; in other words, disorderly conduct which does not amount to a criminal offence can still provide the foundation for a drinking banning order. We therefore have a combination of things. It is not necessary for the police or the local authority seeking such an order to prove that the person against whom the order is to be made has committed a criminal offence but merely that he has been ““disorderly””, whatever that means. As I indicated earlier, the making of the order is just a step forward to the creation of a fresh criminal offence. If on a balance of probabilities and on hearsay evidence a person, because of his disorderly behaviour, which is not a criminal offence, is made subject to a drinking banning order, he can end up being charged with a crime of breaching the order. He gains a criminal record for conduct that is not criminal at all. By definition within the Bill as it is currently drafted, he is guilty of a criminal offence for breaching an order relating to simply disorderly but non-criminal conduct. That is the point that I make in Amendment No. 1. The same point is made in relation to Amendments Nos. 5, 7 and 15, where the same disjunctive concepts of criminal or disorderly conduct appear. We think that it is entirely wrong in principle first to use such a vague term as ““disorderly”” and, secondly, since it is almost by definition not criminal conduct, to enter into a procedure which can result in a criminal conviction. I hope that is a sufficient explanation. I beg to move.