Legislative and Regulatory Reform Bill

I am happy to take that point on board in the ongoing discussions, in which I hope that the Chairman of the Regulatory Reform Committee will be an active participant. A number of the Opposition amendments to new clauses 5, 6 and 14 and to Government amendments Nos. 46, 50 and 54 explore alternative arrangements for the veto. I hope that hon. Members will consider the issues raised during the debate and the rationale for focusing the veto on the powers and conditions in the Bill. I also hope that they are assured of our intention to continue to engage with Parliament on that issue. Some of the amendments deal with the issue of where the responsibility for exercising the veto should lie. They specify that the Committee capable of using the veto should be one""with responsibility for the matter"." Presumably, the rationale behind the amendments is to open the issue of changes to the structure of Committee scrutiny of orders. For instance, the amendments would allow separate Committees to perform procedural matters and the task of reporting on the substance of a draft order. It seems appropriate for the scrutiny of orders to be performed by a single Committee, which would make best use of the understanding of an order built up by a Committee. The Government have assumed that the Regulatory Reform Committee in the House of Commons and the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee in another place will continue to perform those roles, but I stress that those matters are for the House and that, in principle, there would be no objection to other Committees with expert knowledge being involved in the scrutiny of draft orders. As hon. Members know, it has been agreed to expand the remit of the Regulatory Reform Committee. The Government expect it to be appropriate for Standing Orders to reflect the potential need for the Committee to seek expert views from other Committees on particularly complex orders. As noted, that is ultimately an issue for Parliament to decide. Hon. Members have also tabled amendments that would remove provision for the House to overturn a veto exercised by its responsible Committee. To provide that a Committee decision could override the opinion of the House would be an unprecedented step that ultimately could be unworkable in practice. In new clause 14, however, hon. Members suggest a mechanism for the House of Commons to exercise a veto, whereby if a certain percentage of MPs objected to an order in writing, that order would have to be withdrawn. That percentage is set at 10 per cent. The Government are committed to ensuring that the procedural safeguards in the Bill are robust and effective. However, the amendments would create a somewhat arbitrary arrangement which, crucially, does not build on the strength of the existing system for scrutinising orders—namely, the detailed scrutiny given to orders by the specialist Committees. In any case, under the affirmative and super-affirmative procedure, a proposal must, following Committee scrutiny, pass to the House for affirmative resolution. Some hon. Members suggested that the House is excluded from these matters, but that is wide of the mark. There was then a discussion on proposals for a two-year rule whereby once an order had been vetoed a Minister could not table a similar order for the next two years. I understand the reasoning behind those amendments. They seek to ensure that a veto system cannot be abused by a future Government, a point with which I have considerable sympathy, and which ultimately constitutes the rationale for Government amendments to introduce a veto into the Bill. However, we would want to avoid imposing an arbitrary restriction on the order-making process, and I am concerned that the amendments may do precisely that. New clause 6 proposes that where either House decides within 21 days that an order is inappropriate for delivery under the order-making power, it should be the subject matter of primary legislation. That arrangement could be difficult to operate. The Cabinet Committee on the Legislative Programme takes decisions each year on which proposals the Government will take forward by primary legislation. As provided for in clause 12, the explanatory document will describe to Parliament why a proposal is suitable for delivery by order. The legislative programme is carefully planned, and adequate resources need to be in place to take forward a Bill. A procedure such as this, whereby an order could suddenly be translated into primary legislation, could cause unmanageable uncertainty and potentially create a very overcrowded legislative programme. I hope that hon. Members accept that we could not support such an amendment. The Government recognise—this was touched upon—that there are issues surrounding the level of procedural detail that should be contained in statute and in Standing Orders. The Procedure Committee, for instance, has recommended that as far as possible the procedural requirements for scrutiny of orders should be left to House authorities. I have provided assurance that the Government will continue a dialogue with the Chairs of the relevant Committees about appropriate changes to Standing Orders, and I have confirmed, and am happy to confirm again, my intention to listen to views on this issue. Our priority is to get the Bill right, to have a workable system of scrutiny, and to achieve the right balance between creating a power that is able to deliver the regulatory reform agenda and ensuring that effective and robust safeguards are in place. The veto clearly plays an important role in achieving that balance. The Government are confident that in the veto provided we have the substantial and workable safeguard that Committees have requested. However, we will continue to listen to views on the most appropriate form that the veto should take, both during the passage of the Bill and in relation to amendments to Standing Orders once the Bill has been passed.