Legislative and Regulatory Reform Bill

This important group of amendments seeks to introduce similar changes to clauses 14, 15 and 16, which outline the procedure that would apply when an order is to be made under the negative resolution procedure, the affirmative resolution procedure or the super-affirmative resolution procedure. One of our long-held criticisms of the Bill is that it lacks adequate safeguards for the use of its fast-track order-making powers, which many people believe will abolish our constitutional longstops. The Bill has widely become known as the ““abolition of Parliament Bill””. We supported the Government’s amendments to part 1 of the Bill yesterday, following their stated intention that the Bill would deal only with deregulation. However, we made it clear that our overall support would depend on the introduction of further safeguards. The introduction of a procedural veto to the Bill, which would be exercised either by the Houses of Parliament or by Select Committees, was one of the primary mechanisms recommended by my hon. Friend the Member for North-East Hertfordshire (Mr. Heald) and me on Second Reading, as a means of introducing such safeguards. For that reason, an amendment to clause 16 was tabled in Committee. It would have required an order to have been withdrawn or amended if an amendment to the order had been agreed by one or both of the Houses of Parliament or by the relevant Committees of either House. The amendment would have granted Parliament the power to insist on amendments to the order which, if not accepted by the Minister, would have to be withdrawn. The Minister would then have to start the process all over again. The Conservatives were, admittedly, far from being the only ones calling for a parliamentary veto on the use of the procedures in the Bill. The Liberal Democrats have done the same, and I noted with interest the reports of the Regulatory Reform and Public Administration Committees, among whose recommendations was a call for an amendment to the Bill to provide scope for an effective veto. Our support for the insertion of the procedural veto into the Bill meant that we welcomed the then Minister’s announcement in Committee—I see him in his place today—that he would introduce a parliamentary veto on the use of the procedure. The Conservative party welcomes the Government’s amendments on the statutory veto as a significant step in the right direction. It is accepted in most quarters that the Bill requires adequate safeguards so that it is not used in future as a tool for the Executive to abuse its power and discard Parliament. The amendments are meant to carry through the Government’s pledge to build in a veto over an order for the relevant Committees of both Houses of Parliament. However, the amendments fall far short of introducing the robust and firm veto that we would expect to see inserted in such an important and constitutionally significant Bill. Our concerns were heightened when we read the wording of the amendments. The Minister needs to explain exactly what the amendments entail. A Select Committee of either House may recommend that the relevant draft order should not be proceeded with. That recommendation, however, can be discarded if it is rejected by a resolution of the relevant House. Furthermore, when making such a recommendation, the Committee must have considered a range of factors, including those listed in clause 3. Our primary concern is that the conditions imposed on the relevant Committee, by which it is able to exercise such a veto, are excessive. The primary difference between the Government’s amendments and the amendment tabled by Conservative Members in Committee and now in new clause 5 is that the Government’s proposals allow for the veto to be exercised only by a Select Committee, whereas our proposals allow for a veto by either the Committee or the Houses of Parliament. I note that the Procedure Committee, which recently produced an insightful report on the Bill, recommended that the power of veto should be exercised"““outside the Committee as well as within it””." While the Government’s amendments allow both Houses to become involved in the process, they do not contain an automatic right of veto. If either House is unhappy with an order, it cannot veto it until a Committee has acted. The Procedure Committee’s report noted that there was no need for the Bill to include a power of veto exercised beyond the Committee. It recommended that the mechanism by which the House of Commons exercised the veto should rest on House of Commons procedure. Is the Government’s failure to empower Parliament by including an automatic veto in the Bill a result of that recommendation? If so, what steps will be taken to amend the House’s procedure to ensure that it possesses a veto and that the mechanics are fully in place? More urgently, why will the Government not accept that this is a matter of great concern to Opposition parties and other Members who have voiced concerns and deal with the matter now, setting out the balances and stating the powers in the Bill? While the Opposition are concerned about the lack of a parliamentary veto under the Government’s amendments, we are also concerned that a Committee could have its veto overridden by a resolution of the relevant House. According to the wording of the Government’s amendments, the veto of a Select Committee, which the Cabinet Office proudly proclaimed in its press release on 4 May, is effectively nothing more than a recommendation. The difference between a veto and a recommendation is obvious and needs no further explanation. Were a Commons Committee to recommend that no further proceedings were to take place, is it not likely that the Government would simply use their majority in the House to overrule it? Would not that negate completely the introduction of the veto? If the Government have their way on this set of provisions, how will Parliament be able to ensure that the more contentious issues are dealt with in the Lords, where the veto is not capable of being vetoed by majority party votes?