Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill [HL]

My Lords, I apologise for missing the opening speeches as, at the time, I was in a plane, perhaps appropriately for this debate, nearer heaven. There seem to be two general kinds of objection to the Bill. First, even with no objection in principle to assisted dying in extreme circumstances, there are many valid worries about its implementation. They range from the technical—how you handle the taxonomy of the variety of disorders, some mild, some very serious, brigaded under the heading of depression—to the societal, such as the pressures, subtle or maybe not so subtle, that may be put on dependent people. Secondly, there is strong opposition in principle from those whose ideological—usually religious—beliefs would forbid assisted dying. If the volume of correspondence, much of which is apparently written to templates, is representative, very often objections of the second kind—objections in principle—masquerade as objections to practicalities, which in no way diminishes the importance of the practicalities. I am particularly unhappy about the oft-repeated argument that what we really need is better palliative care. Of course we need better palliative care that is more widely, fairly and uniformly distributed. I believe that progress in that direction is much more important than this Bill. But all that is somewhat beside the point. Assisted dying and palliative care are not alternatives; they are two separate, if interrelated, issues. The plain fact is that, for many, even the best palliative care of the future, never mind the imperfections of today, will often come to intersect eventually with a loss of autonomy, dignity and, indeed, a meaningful sense of self, such that some of us, probably always a small minority, may wish to choose an end. In this House, we are often engaged in passionate debate about issues on which we try to weigh the interests of the individual against the interests of the community. The essential issue in this Bill is the individual right, in extremis and hedged with appropriate caveats, to make a decision about oneself. I believe that that is not a decision for a doctor or for the state to make. Even less is it a decision to be made based on religious views that I do not share. While I recognise that there can be substantial problems in the detailed implementation of the purpose that the Bill of the noble Lord, Lord Joffe, seeks to serve, and while I have great respect for those for whom such concerns are paramount, ultimately I am in agreement with the spirit of the Bill, which is why I will vote for it.