Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill [HL]

My Lords, I am sure that all Members in this House, whatever views they hold on the Bill, wish profoundly that palliative care for the dying should be made better and more accessible. Assisted suicide is not and never will be a substitute. Having said that, I want to make two further points. First, like others, I remind your Lordships of the extremely narrow scope of the Bill. It is irrational, in my view, to reject the Bill on the grounds that its scope will inevitably be widened. The Bill excludes euthanasia, even if this may be what the patient would prefer. It excludes assisted suicide, except where a patient is facing imminent death with no hope of recovery. It excludes assisted suicide unless the patient is thought to be wholly determined and of sound mind. It presumes only that in certain circumstances suicide is a rational choice. There can be no evidence that this Bill poises us on the top of a slippery slope, let alone one that leads to the widespread euthanasia of the vulnerable—an argument that we hear over and over again. Of course, some of those who fall within the scope of the Bill may be disabled. Others will not, except that they will be disabled by their illness. There is no threat in the Bill to the disabled in general, still less to those who are mentally disabled. My second point is this. The whole purpose of my noble friend’s Bill is to define a small category of person for whom the general law against assisted suicide should not apply. It is to be presumed that these people, who choose suicide when facing the suffering that will lead to their death, do not think it morally wrong to do so. It is not contrary to their moral principles, or, perhaps, those of their family. Is it just, then, that they should be governed by moral principles, whether of the clergy or the medical profession, in which they do not believe? I do not argue that they should disregard the law simply because they do not agree with it; only that the law should be changed in such a way that they, in their extreme circumstances, should be allowed to follow the morality in which they do believe, not another which would compel them to live against their wish.