Natural Environment and Rural Communities Bill

My Lords, I am grateful for what the noble Baroness, Lady Byford, and the noble Lord, Lord Bradshaw, have said. Of course, this compromise does not suit everybody. There will be those who are not entirely satisfied with it; very few people will be entirely satisfied with it. I appreciate the point that the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, made, but it is our view that this is a sensible and suitable compromise and that the Government have listened to the representations that have been made so powerfully—in this House, in the other place and in postbags. Of course the postbags have gone both ways, but in particular in one way. I turn immediately to the last point made by the noble Lord, Lord Brooke. The number of claims in Wiltshire is certainly high—there are 85 outstanding BOAT claims. This does not make it the worst, but the figure is high. That does not seem to be the experience in Cheshire, although I do not have the figures for that county. I shall deal now with the detailed questions, including one that was raised in our last debate and the query put by the noble Lord, Lord Bradshaw. This may take me a little time but I will be as quick as I can. The exemption from prosecution under new Section 34(2A) of the Road Traffic Act 1988, inserted by Clause 70 of the Bill, moves to the purchaser of the property, provided that the way was in use at the time that the RUPP became a restricted byway. The ““private right”” in Clause 67(4) is also attached to the land. The noble Lord, Lord Bradshaw, asked whether, if a person has submitted a claim that is still outstanding and would be preserved by Clause 67(3), that person can continue to use that right of way with a motor vehicle until that claim has been determined and whether the police would be able to prosecute that person. Whether it would be illegal to drive on that right of way would ultimately depend on whether the claim is justified—in other words, where the public motor vehicular rights can be proved to exist. Schedule 7 to the CROW Act strengthens Section 34 of the Road Traffic Act, so that a right of way is taken to carry only those rights that are shown on the definitive map and statement unless the contrary can be proved. In other words, the burden of proof has now been placed squarely on a defendant to prove that public motor vehicular rights exist in order to avoid conviction. So, for example, where a right of way on the definitive map is a presumption, that is correct until proved otherwise. It has become apparent to us that Schedule 7 to the CROW Act has been widely misunderstood and that many enforcement agencies and rights of way professionals do not appreciate that the strength in Section 34 is already in force and has been since shortly after the CROW Act received Royal Assent. It is for that reason that we have recently published the guidance entitled Regulating the use of motor vehicles on public rights of way and off road: A guide for Local Authorities, Police and Community Safety Partnerships. It provides information to encourage enforcement authorities to make better use of existing legislation. After commencement of Part 6 of this Bill, where claims are not preserved by Clause 67(3) or where there are no outstanding claims, which is of course the vast majority of cases, those who drive motor vehicles on rights of way that are not already recorded as byways open to all traffic will no longer be able to rely on unrecorded public motor vehicular rights as a defence because those rights will, subject to the exemption in Clause 67(3), have been extinguished by subsection (1). This is a complex area of law and we intend to issue guidance to the police, local authorities and others about the rights of way provisions in this Bill. It will include guidance to assist with enforcement of the law over rights of way which are the subject of outstanding applications for BOATs at the time this part becomes law. When a claim has been submitted but not determined, the prosecuting authorities of course have a discretion whether to prosecute in each case, and the existence of a pending application may be a factor relevant to the exercise of that discretion. I hope that I have answered all the points raised both in the last debate and today. If not, I shall write to all noble Lords concerned and make available copies of that reply. But so far as the dates are concerned, I am grateful for the attitude taken by noble Lords on the Front Benches and in other parts of the House.