Natural Environment and Rural Communities Bill

moved Amendment No. 131:"Before Clause 58, insert the following new clause—" ““CRITERIA FOR DESIGNATING NATIONAL PARKS (1)   In section 5 of the National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act 1949 (c. 97) (criteria for designating National Parks), after subsection (2) insert— ““(2A)   Natural England may— (a)   when applying subsection (2)(a) in relation to an area, take into account its wildlife and cultural heritage, and (b)   when applying subsection (2)(b) in relation to that area, take into account the extent to which it is possible to promote opportunities for the understanding and enjoyment of its special qualities by the public.”” (2)   The amendment made by subsection (1) applies for the purposes of the confirmation or variation on or after the day on which this section comes into force of orders made before that day as it applies for the purposes of the confirmation or variation of orders made on or after that day.”” The noble Lord said: My Lords, this group of amendments arises from a recent High Court judgment that is known as the Meyrick judgment. Government Amendment No. 131 will restore to the legislation the meaning which the Government and others had always understood it to have prior to the judgment being given. Amendment No. 133 is a purely stylistic change consequent on Amendment No. 131. Since Amendment No. 131 will introduce a new clause before Clause 58 which contains the first and full reference to the National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act 1949, subsequent references need do no more than refer to the ““1949 Act””. We do not need to worry about Amendment No. 133. Amendments Nos. 132 and 170, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Byford, would consolidate the Meyrick interpretation by enshrining it in primary legislation. I can inform the House that my department has just learnt that it has been granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal in the Meyrick case. Lord Justice Keene stated:"““The grounds are properly arguable and, in any event, raise issues of importance which ought to be considered by the Court of Appeal””." But let us put that on one side for the moment and deal with the issues in Parliament. The Meyrick judgment dealt with the criteria in the National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act 1949 that are used when deciding whether land should be designated as a national park. By treating the land in dispute in isolation from the rest of the New Forest in which it lies, the judgment was quite at odds with what the 1949 Act intended and with how it has been applied over the years. For example, on the natural beauty criterion, Meyrick stated in relation to the land in dispute,"““well-maintained historic parkland providing the setting for a grade 1 listed building, and well-ordered dairy fields of dairy farms would seem to be the antithesis of naturalness””." Yet we know that such land features strongly in the existing national parks. One need look no further than the Chatsworth estate for an example of an historic house and parkland forming an integral part of a national park—in that case, the Peak District. The Chatsworth estate does not sit in isolation, but forms part of the extensive tract of diverse countryside, recognised for its natural beauty, that is the Peak District. And one need look no further than the Council for National Parks website to see that farmland of all kinds—not just dairy land—makes up an important part of our existing national parks. Agricultural land makes up 54 per cent of the Peak District National Park, for example. Without further case law, one cannot be sure how far the ramifications of the Meyrick judgment might extend. But if parkland and dairy farms are not to meet the natural beauty test, what of arable land or woodlands, or indeed any land that has an orderly or managed appearance? If all those elements previously thought to form part of natural beauty—flora, fauna, geology, physiography—are now to be stripped out of the definition, what does that do to our concept of a national park? I could bring forward evidence in support of our claim that the Meyrick judgment is not consistent with established practice, by which I mean the method used to settle the boundaries of the eight national parks in England and three in Wales that were designated in the years following the 1949 Act. That Act implemented the 1947 report of the National Parks Committee, which recommended the areas that should be considered for designation and the arrangements for their administration. It included eight points, which it introduced with the words,"““The following considerations should in our opinion be taken into account in the precise definition of national park boundaries””." This is the first consideration:"““The first criterion should be the inclusion of areas of high landscape quality””." I pause to point out that there is no reference here to relative naturalness. The second consideration was to be,"““features of scientific historic or architectural value (e.g. nature reserves, important archaeological sites and ancient monuments) which are situated on the margins of a national park should be included where practicable””." Far from being ineligible for designation, we argue that it is more in keeping with the original 1947 intentions to include wildlife and historical sites on the boundary. Further commentary on the intended operation of the 1949 Act was added by the Sandford committee in 1974 and the Edwards committee in 1991, which was adopted as government policy in circular 12/96. That 1996 circular noted that the Edwards committee had not recommended any change to the statutory criteria for designating land, but went on to endorse the committee’s formulation of what it termed ““the essence of national parks””, which it described as,"““the striking quality and remoteness of much of their scenery, the harmony between man and nature it displays, and the opportunities it offers for suitable forms of recreation””." The conclusion I am asking the House to make is that the criteria for withdrawing national park boundaries have always been based on the combination of the concise words used in the 1949 Act and the commentary on them contained in administrative documents such as the ones I have mentioned. The Meyrick judgment has substituted a new commentary, which, if we do not change it, whether on appeal or within this legislation, will trump a long line of such reports going back to the 1947 report of the National Parks Committee. Looking at the wider implications of the judgment, our concern is not just about national parks. National parks share the same test, as far as natural beauty is concerned, with areas of outstanding beauty. AONBs were also introduced in 1949 to conserve those landscapes that had the same outstanding qualities of natural beauty but often, because of their more intensively farmed nature, did not offer the same opportunities for public recreation. They cover areas, as the House will know, such as Dedham Vale—Constable country, of course—the Kent Weald and the Cotswolds. The implications of the Meyrick judgment to them are potentially even more significant. The Countryside Agency has no area in the process of being designated as an AONB, but it is regularly asked by local authorities and others to review the boundaries of an AONB. If that were done without the amendments brought today, it would radically change the basis for considering AONB designations, and could reduce sharply the level of protection afforded to our most cherished landscapes. On a broader point, a requirement in Section 17 of the Agriculture Act 1986 for the Minister in discharging any functions connected with agriculture in relation to any land is to take into account, among other things,"““the conservation and enhancement of the natural beauty of the countryside””." It seems unlikely that it was intended to exclude dairy farms from this requirement. We do not accept the Meyrick concept of what a national park should be, or the learned High Court judge’s definition of ““natural beauty”” as expressed in that case, which would be applied to AONBs. As I say, we have just received news that we have leave to appeal, but we want to take this opportunity to clarify the 1949 Act as the preferable and clearer route to dispel the uncertainty that has been created. I shall talk about our Amendment No. 131, which will clarify the interpretation of the criteria in Section 5 of the National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act 1949 for a national park, and return its interpretation to how I argue it was generally understood prior to the Meyrick judgment in the challenge to the New Forest national park designation confirmation order. As I have argued, the former understanding can be traced back over the past 56 years. The amendment addresses the interface between the national park purposes and the criteria that are used for deciding whether land should be designated. We had always understood purposes and criteria to be two sides of the same coin, but the Meyrick judgment said they were not connected, with the purposes coming into play only after designation. The amendment addresses that issue by adjusting the wording of the criteria to include, ““for the purposes””, to make it clear that national park purposes are behind them. New Clause 97, which I am afraid I mistakenly moved in Committee, but which I intended to retable with identical wording on Report once further work had been completed on the criteria amendment, addresses the degree of naturalness needed to meet the natural beauty criterion. It does so by providing that certain factors need not preclude a finding of natural beauty, and will apply to areas of outstanding natural beauty as well as the national parks, and in other contexts. It takes into account the fact that no landscape in the United Kingdom has escaped human influence, and I hope Clause 97 will remain part of the Bill. I remind noble Lords that the Countryside Agency must consult widely before making a national park or AONB designation order, and that any local authority objection would trigger a public inquiry. That inquiry is before an independent inspector who hears evidence on the merits of the designation and scrutinises every length of proposed boundary in detail. This public inquiry is the correct forum in which to consider complex judgments about whether a particular piece of land meets the criteria for designation. Our amendment to Section 5 of the 1949 Act criteria merely ensures that the inquiry can consider the full range of matters that have been considered in previous designations since 1949. It does not prejudge the outcome in any particular case. I know several noble Lords are concerned that our amendments will make it in some sense easier to designate national parks and therefore lead to a new wave of designation. My reply is that our intention is to return the criteria to where we believe they were before the Meyrick judgment. Let us examine briefly what happened pre-Meyrick. In the past 50 years in England, there have been just three areas considered for national park status: the Norfolk and Suffolk broads, the New Forest and the South Downs. All three of those areas were proposed as national parks in the 1940s. No decision has yet been taken on the South Downs. Of course I cannot commit future governments, but on this evidence the application of the pre-Meyrick interpretation did not lead to a steady stream of fresh proposals; indeed, quite the reverse. I think that is where I should sit down and let the noble Baroness speak to her amendment.