Work and Families Bill

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Miller, and to the noble Lord, Lord Northbourne, for tabling these amendments so that we can discuss this issue. On Amendments Nos. 3 and 3A, as I outlined on Second Reading, existing paternity provisions require that, for a father to qualify for paternity leave, which will now be known as ordinary paternity leave, he must, in the case of the birth of a child—rather than adoption—be either the father of the child, or married to, or the partner—including civil partner—of the child’s mother, and be responsible for the upbringing of the child. This definition was consulted on prior to the introduction of paternity leave in 2003 and was accepted as a reasonable definition that encompassed a wide range of fathers, who would be supporting the mother and child after the birth of the child. This definition clearly outlines who could be eligible, which would not be the case were we to adopt the ““parental responsibility”” phrase suggested by Amendment No. 3A. We intend to adopt the same relationship criteria for fathers to be able to take additional paternity leave, subject to other qualification criteria, as we believe that these are the right criteria and we have no evidence to prove otherwise. This will keep the scheme straightforward and help both employees and their employers to understand who is eligible. In most cases, an employee who wishes to take additional paternity leave and pay will have taken ordinary paternity leave and his employer will, therefore, have processed a claim, so having the same definition means the employer will not have to check again. The current definition that I have outlined has not caused any concern or any problems for employees or their employers in taking and administering ordinary paternity leave. We would not envisage there being any new problems by adopting the same definition for the additional paternity leave scheme. This leave is to care for the child. It is important for both parent and child and it has been proved that contact between the child and father during the first year has educational benefits in later life, as we spoke about earlier. Even if the father is not the biological father, but is caring for the child, the same benefits apply. In these modern times we have to be realistic. Marriages and relationships break down, divorces occur and, therefore, we need to be able to provide for these circumstances and ensure that the child receives the best possible care. The noble Baroness, Lady Miller, gave us some permutations on what modern life can throw up. For example, could it honestly be said that a step-parent should not be eligible for this leave despite being one of the primary carers of the child? If the step-parent is responsible for the upbringing up of the child and the mother wishes to return to work, the step-parent should be able to take the time off to care for that child. The child can benefit from this as much as if the biological father were caring for the child. Although this example would not apply if we were to adopt the ““parental responsibility”” definition, as this could include step-parents, parental responsibility could cause problems as it can require complex legal processes to establish who has parental responsibility. Under current law, a mother always has parental responsibility for her child. A father, however, has this responsibility only if he is married to the mother, is named on the birth certificate as the father of the child or has acquired legal responsibility for his child. Living with the mother, even for a long time, does not automatically give a father parental responsibility.