Work and Families Bill

I rise to speak to Amendment No. 3A, which, by implication, is critical of Amendment No. 3 but perhaps not as critical as it is of the existing government proposals. On Second Reading, the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, said, at col. 1120, said that the definition of a ““father”” for the purposes of the Bill is that he is the father of the child or married to, or a partner of, the child’s mother and is responsible for bringing up the child. Amendment No. 3 does not make a definition of ““partner”” but, rather, defines the relationship which must exist between the father, the mother and the child. The father must be the biological father and cohabit with the mother at the time, and contribute to the maintenance of the child or his mother. My amendment follows Amendment No. 3, which has many merits, but it substitutes ““parental responsibility”” for the words ““biological father””. I am concerned about unsuitable biological fathers and also the exclusion of non-biological fathers, who may for one reason or another be committed to the well-being of the child. As I understand it, and judging by the speeches on Second Reading, the principal purpose of paternity leave and additional paternity leave is to enable and encourage fathers to bond with their children. Such bonding is not much use—indeed, it can even be harmful—if the father has no intention of being involved with the child in the long term. Today, any father who wants to make a long-term commitment to his child can easily do so. He can have parental responsibility for that child simply by signing the birth register, unless he is married to the mother, in which case he has it automatically. I believe that my amendment therefore adequately covers fathers who want to make a serious and helpful commitment to their child. As I see it, the advantages that it has over the other amendments are as follows. First, the fact that a man is the birth father of a child does not mean that he intends to make a long-term commitment to him or her, even if he may still be living with the mother when the child is born. Furthermore, he may not be a suitable person to care for the child. Secondly, parental responsibility is a well established concept in law. It is easy, if necessary, to verify it and so it would tend to reduce fraud and perhaps make Amendment No. 4 unnecessary. Thirdly, in my view there is a very strong case for trying to bring together the definition of a father and his rights and responsibilities into an existing legal definition rather than have yet another definition. We have definitions under anti-social behaviour legislation and the Child Support Act and definitions of parental responsibility under the Children Acts. In a way, one of the greatest difficulties experienced by parents and people who advise parents is that the law is extremely uncertain. If anyone does not believe me, two publications produced by the National Family and Parenting Institute over the past 12 months make that point in great detail. I should be happy to give the Minister the references. Finally, there may be cases—I admit that these are perhaps less frequent than in times past—where the husband of the mother accepts paternity of the child for the mother’s and the child’s sake, even if he is not the biological father. In a situation of that kind, it could be greatly in the best interests of the child for the father, although he is not the biological father, to have the opportunity to have paternity leave.