Compensation Bill [HL]

My Lords, the difficulty I have with the amendment is that it will be more restrictive on the courts than the current law and would not help the aims of Clause 1. The factor in Clause 1 may be of relevance in other types of cases; for example, those involving damage to property. The current law enables the court to take into account the nature of an activity and the impact on it of precautions which it is argued should have been taken in any case in which it considers that to be relevant. As noble Lords know, we have reflected that provision in Clause 1. Limiting the clause to personal injury and other types of case to be specified later would represent a restriction on the present freedom of the courts to consider all the circumstances; for example, the damage resulting from a defendant’s negligence may be an injury or damage to property. It could be if the negligence alleged is in driving and the car is damaged, or in running an activity in which the claimant falls and damages or loses valuable possessions. Similarly, for some breaches of statutory duty the damage suffered may be to property alone. The activity and the defendant’s behaviour may be the same, but the court’s present ability to take all the circumstances into account would be restricted. That is in a way an arbitrary restriction, which could cause confusion. Requiring specific types of claim to be prescribed by order could be cumbersome and unnecessary, and would run the risk that particular types of case where the court might want to consider the factor in Clause 1 to be relevant would not be caught. But the objection is more fundamental than that. The amendment runs contrary to our approach, because it would reduce the flexibility available to the courts to balance the impact of precautions against the risk involved and the nature of the activity giving rise to the risk. Reducing the scope of the court’s powers in that way would deprive the clause, and the message it sends, of much of its force. In addition, it is not in accordance with the approach taken in Part 2, because they are quite different. I understand the message that the noble Lord seeks to send, and I am keen to keep sending that message, but there are other mechanisms that we wish to use to do that, not least through the work across government, as I have indicated. Part 2 is about bringing into regulation those things that are not currently regulated, while Clause 1 is seeking to do something different in reflecting the existing flexibility of the courts. For those reasons I am not able to accept the amendment, but as always I take on board what the noble Lord is seeking to achieve. Sending messages about frivolous and unwarranted claims is an important part of how we tackle the perception of the compensation culture. It is something that I shall be keen to work on with the noble Lord’s support.