UK Parliament / Open data

Police and Justice Bill

I will return to that point on another occasion. I am here to argue against the proposals in the Bill. The role of RSLs has always concerned housing issues. Although they may well have a role in referring cases that they regard as worrying to an expert, they are not, as far as I am aware, qualified to issue such judgments, which may stigmatise a family or a child, albeit that their intentions were honourable. Will the Minister elaborate on how that might be regulated, or how qualifications or training might be involved, to ensure that anyone given that power to invoke the order has the necessary expertise, objectivity and accountability? What starts as a parenting order becomes, if breached, a criminal offence. That is worrying. It follows the trend of converting an offence to a criminal offence, presumably with a custodial sentence. The problem with that part of being tough on crime is that, when push comes to shove, the custodial sentence has often seemed out of proportion to the crime. Despite guidelines to magistrates and courts stating that such breaches are not to be regarded as not serious, those carrying out the sentencing appear to disagree. That is particularly evident in relation to antisocial behaviour orders. A third of ASBOs are being breached and sentencing is not following guidelines. The Minister may be aware that I have tabled a parliamentary question to try to establish exactly what is happening with the sentencing that follows breached ASBOs. The proposed extension of police powers—the general power to impose conditions on pre-charge bail for all criminal investigations and the power to impose punitive conditions on cautions—amounts to summary justice. Because those powers are applicable to all criminal investigations, there must be a danger that they will be abused. The Bill enables restrictions, fines or summary sentencing to be imposed on an individual. Those powers mean that the police could, at will, decide to act as they have done before where they have been given such discretion. There will be, in their summary justice, a tendency towards disproportionality. The race equality impact assessment says that we do not yet have enough information to judge the impact of this, and that that should be monitored. I hope that we can discuss that in Committee. Several elements of the Bill lay open community issues. Part 4, which aims to merge the five criminal justice inspectorates, has been widely discussed. We have no objection to that in principle, but we are worried about the loss of a specialist quality service within the new joint inspectorate. The proposal has provoked apprehension, particularly among the prison and police sectors. We are greatly concerned about the practicalities of such a merger and what reduction in standards, or loss, might come about as a consequence. I ask the Government to think twice about the details of this, particularly in relation to prisons. The inspection of prisons and the discovery of abuses is a truly specialised skill. The prison inspectorate plays a unique role in upholding human rights, and I am worried about losing such an important protection for those who are held in our prisons. The current system for detecting abuses and faults has been developed independently by the prison inspectorate from its vast and specialist knowledge. If it were to be incorporated into one general body, I fear not only that its specialised knowledge would be in danger of diminishing, but that there would be less room for it to be truly independent, with the discovery of abuses being jeopardised as a result. Can the Government give a reassurance that the proposed merger will not result in what amounts merely to an audit trail and bean-counting function? Credibility is also important. Her Majesty’s chief inspector of constabulary has a phenomenal reputation. When he produces a report or makes a statement, the public, but, more important, the police, genuinely listen. A generalist or managing chief inspector will never be able to command such respect, legitimacy or confidence. I want to consider a further danger—in the balance between the freedom of individuals to go where they will without fear or favour if they do no harm, and the protection of our citizens against crime and terrorism. There is a problem with the proposal about making passenger flight lists available because it moves from the ability to request information on domestic flight passenger lists in the cause of detecting a crime, to the surveillance of an individual’s movements before a crime has been committed. The Government’s intention to gather passenger data from domestic journeys means another fundamental shift in the relationship between state and individual. Although the Bill provides for the same powers as those in the Immigration, Nationality and Asylum Act 2006 on international flights, there is a difference when such surveillance is internal. It is imperative in the sort of socio-political climate in which we live to avoid a culture of total suspicion of anyone and everyone. We must therefore have the courage to defend civil liberties as the process goes forward. Although I am sure that the motivation behind the proposal is to enable police to see patterns of travel to stop crime and, presumably, to recognise those who might appear suspicious, it marks a shift to crime prediction under the label of crime prevention. It is a difficult line to walk but, with no ground for suspicion and no crime to investigate, there is a worry that there may be nothing to stop the police selecting all routes at all times. There would therefore be nothing to protect individuals from inappropriate surveillance of their movements or to defend their liberty to move around the country. There must therefore be concern about the open-ended permit to watch what we do and safeguards must be put in place to protect individuals against inappropriate surveillance or use of the information about their movements. I hope that, in Committee, we can agree on safeguards. In a letter to my hon. Friend the Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Carmichael), the Home Office stated that clause 9 was"““not designed to allow the routine surveillance of all domestic passengers. The police will only request data on the domestic routes that are of operational interest and likely to provide the greatest amount of intelligence essential to combat terrorism and serious organised crime. They are not designed to keep track of all domestic passengers.""They will help the police gain effective intelligence on the movement of known terrorist suspects and criminals and will allow them to build up a detailed picture of suspect passengers, travel patterns and networks.””" Although the letter suggests that there is no intention of blanket use of the power, the police officer who attended the meeting to discuss the Bill believed that the purpose was to build up patterns to prevent crime or terrorism. Surely that must be the point of introducing such a power. How far is the step from the contents of the Home Office letter—using the power only when tracking a ““person of interest””—to an illegitimate interest in persons, especially those with Muslim-sounding surnames? That is another concern in the context of the race equality impact assessment. Will the power be extended to all flights at all times? The race equality impact study has not found a problem so far. However, we should examine that in Committee because it is an obvious danger, which is inherent in tracking or predicting movement patterns. Section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000 allows stops without a reasonable ground for suspicion. That was theoretically for a specified area and time but has ended up, for example, for the whole of London all the time. Has the Minister considered establishing an independent body to oversee collecting information on domestic flights? What assurance can be given that information will not be collected on all flights all the time? In the letter, we are told that"““requests for information will be recorded and there will be a clear audit trail to safeguard against ‘fishing trips’. And that in addition, only police officers of the rank of superintendent or above may authorise a request.””" However, as I said, section 44 started with similar safeguards, but its operation is now permanent across London. There is a great range of issues about which we have concerns and I hope that we can work with the Government on them in Committee. I will listen with great interest to the debate and to the Minister’s responses to the issues that I have raised.
Type
Proceeding contribution
Reference
443 c634-7 
Session
2005-06
Chamber / Committee
House of Commons chamber
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