Terrorism Bill

: I shall be brief, because I know that many Members wish to speak. I urge the House to support Lords amendment No. 5, which effectively does away entirely with clause 1(4). That subsection, like the Bill itself, is unnecessary and, at worst, mischievous. Let me explain why it is unnecessary. I shall do so as simply as I can. I must see the legislation through the dark prism of the eyes of a prosecuting criminal lawyer, and in my time I have prosecuted the worst of them; but when I consider likely offences, I cannot think of an actual or—to answer a point made earlier—an imagined circumstance involving the imparting of glorification, coupled with encouragement or inducement to emulate, that would not be caught by existing legislation on incitement. I shall be happy if any Member can give me an example of a case in which I would not advise prosecution in such circumstances. I have struggled, and if I could have thought of such an instance, I should have been happy for the Bill to be given a much clearer passage. The fact that no such instance can be imagined, and the fact that the legislation is unnecessary, lead to the inevitable suspicion—ventilated and articulated in this House—that the motivation is to persuade the people that the Government are doing something, and, worse still, to provide an alibi for what has not been done in the past. Pre-eminent in this context is the case of Mr. Abu Hamza. I do not know why he was not prosecuted months or years ago under existing legislation. I am sure that at some stage those with responsibility, in the Home Office or in the departments directly under its aegis, will explain why Mr. Abu Hamza was not prosecuted months or years ago, together with the other clerics who are spreading violence and the concept of violence, and the encouragement of and incitement to violence that has been described to us. Equally, I do not know why those who carried placards during the demonstration that has rightly been referred to many times—placards that were classic incitements to violence—have not been prosecuted, and were not apprehended at the time. That failure has done no favours at all to the Islamic community. I am afraid that I was not present for Prime Minister’s Questions—and I have been told by the Whips that I can go home whenever I like during this debate—but I understand that the Prime Minister suggested that we needed the Bill in order to catch precisely those people who wave placards. I do not know who briefed the Prime Minister, but I can say for certain who did not brief him: the Home Secretary’s parliamentary private secretary, my good, learned and honourable Friend the Member for Redcar (Vera Baird), who would know perfectly well that what those placards contained was a direct incitement to violence. I do not know where that idea came from, but those holding the placards should, and could, have been prosecuted. The second issue is the mischief that the use of the term ““glorification”” will lead to. ““Glorification”” is a wonderful word; it is resonant, rotund, glorious. It has no place whatsoever in criminal jurisprudence and absolutely no place in this particular criminal jurisprudence. In dealing with this desperate and sensitive area of law at this desperate and sensitive time, we must ensure that the law is hard, clinical, analytical, direct and immediately understandable by any who seek to look at it. It must contain the vernacular that underlines all those elements. ““Glorification”” is a word that is interpreted subjectively, as we wish to interpret it; my ““glorification”” is not others’. Without a shadow of doubt, if we pass this legislation the office of the Attorney-General will be besieged by those who believe that what somebody else has said—be they Islamic or Christian; it does not matter—constitutes a glorification of terrorism. Demands will be made for the Attorney-General to exercise his discretion and if he agrees to do so, it will cause immense trouble and pain. If he does not, that will also cause immense trouble and pain. The problem stems from the use of this word. ““Glorification”” is wonderful from the pen of Blake or Milton; it is glorious in the music of Frideric Handel. But we do not do beatitudes in the Old Bailey; rather, we do law, conviction and punishment, which is what should have happened in the case of Abu Hamza and others a very long time ago. I hope, even now, that this wholly unnecessary word can be expunged from this statute. Of course, it will not be, but I hope that it will through the accepting of this amendment. I also hope that in future, we will have more necessary and successful prosecutions in the Old Bailey, and fewer wholly unnecessary and grotesquely mischievous attempts at legislation such as this.