Terrorism Bill

No. The hon. Gentleman has intervened already and I want to make progress. The reason we made a manifesto commitment and why we think glorification should be dealt with as I propose is that people who glorify terrorism help to create a climate in which terrorism is regarded as somehow acceptable. They help to persuade impressionable members of their audiences that they have a moral duty to kill innocent people in pursuit of whatever political or religious ideology they espouse. In recent times, we have seen threats from extremists who claim to represent Islam. As I said in answer to my hon. Friend the Member for Leicester, East (Keith Vaz), leaders of the Muslim community in the UK and elsewhere have, quite properly, explained that such views do not represent true Islam. None the less, all too many people may be influenced by those who glorify terrorism and conclude that they have a duty to kill and injure innocent bystanders in the misguided belief that they are bound to do so by their faith. Our duty to those we represent is to do everything we can to prevent that from happening. Both Houses have agreed that there will be an offence of encouraging terrorism and that the offence will cover both direct and indirect encouragement. I am, however, concerned by the changes made to clause 1 and replicated in clause 21 by the Members of the other place. The Lords removed a provision which clarified that statements that constituted indirect encouragement included statements that glorified acts of terrorism and were statements from which those members of the audience who heard them could reasonably be expected to infer that what was being glorified was being glorified as conduct that should be emulated by them in existing circumstances. That was a clear provision in the Bill considered by the Lords. Taken with a definition of ““glorification”” in clause 20, it made what was being described perfectly clear. Moreover, it made it abundantly clear to everyone who had heard about the offence that glorifying terrorism in such a way that others might emulate it would no longer be tolerated. Instead of that clear provision, which sent a strong message to all those who are involved in recruiting terrorists, the Lords inserted an alternative provision stating that "““‘indirect encouragement’ comprises the making of a statement describing terrorism in such a way that the listener would infer that he should emulate it.””" That alternative is unacceptable for three main reasons. I will explain those reasons in a moment, but perhaps I should first remind the House that glorification features in the Bill as an example of what is encompassed by the concept of indirect encouragement. It is not self-contained. Glorification as an offence is a subset of indirect encouragement as an offence and can be committed only if the conditions surrounding the main offence are met, as I just said to my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Northfield (Richard Burden). Key among those conditions is the requirement that there must be an intention that others should be induced to commit terrorist offences or subjective recklessness on that point. Glorification without intention of emulation or without subjective recklessness cannot constitute an offence. As I said, the Opposition’s preferred form of words is unacceptable for three reasons. First, instead of being an exemplary description of what indirect encouragement could be, it is an exhaustive description. In other words, the offence is limited so that it is committed by making available to the public a statement directly encouraging terrorism, or a statement indirectly encouraging it, but only by actually describing it in such a way that that the listener will infer that he should emulate it. The Government drafted the offence carefully so that it would cover all statements that were either an encouragement to terrorism or another form of inducement to terrorism. As we designed the offence, it covered statements that constituted direct and indirect encouragement and that made explicit references to terrorism, as well as those that encouraged terrorism but did not refer explicitly to it. Let me put the argument as simply as I can. The use of the word ““describing”” in the Lords amendment means that the provision would not catch, as the original wording would, glorification, praise or celebration of an act of terrorism that does not actually describe the act. Similarly, the reference in the wording inserted by the other place to ““listener”” also limits the scope of the provision. It confines the definition to statements that are capable of being heard and so, for example, would exclude statements written on placards or published on websites.