Natural Environment and Rural Communities Bill

We will meet this point again a little later on. I will take the same attitude to it then as I do now. Amendment No. 288 would amend the entry powers available to inspectors via a different route from that taken by Amendment No. 282. It does so by amending the definition of ““premises”” in Clause 45. At present, the definition reads:"““‘Premises’ include land (including buildings), movable structures, vehicles, vessels, aircraft and other means of transport.””" The amendment would add the caveat that ““premises”” excludes private dwellings. The legal effect would be to exclude the power to enter dwellings altogether, even under warrant. Noble Lords will appreciate that I have already made it clear that, in relation to this offence, an inspector should not be able to enter a person’s home without having obtained a warrant from a court, and there are quite extensive constraints on the circumstances in which an inspector can obtain such a warrant. I think that the Committee will agree that that is right and proper. The intention behind Amendment No. 288 might, however, be to go further than I have already stated. Its legal effect would be to exclude the right to enter private dwellings altogether—that is, with or without a warrant. I am sure that that is not what is intended, as a wrongdoer would only have to keep pesticides in his house in order to escape detection. No one wants that to be the case for a moment, but we believe that that would be the effect of Amendment No. 288. Clause 44 as it stands contains sufficient safeguards to make this amendment unnecessary. I appreciate the positive motive behind the amendment, but its actual effect would go further than it would be appropriate to accept. However, we are sympathetic to the concerns expressed by noble Lords about the rights of the individual who might face investigation for a pesticide possession offence. As we said in another place, inspectors’ powers would be looked at carefully over the Recess. That further consideration has now resulted in the introduction of the three government amendments referred to. These amendments clarify the powers available to inspectors who are investigating pesticide possession offences under Clause 43. They introduce a condition of reasonable suspicion, remove a power to require a statement of truth, and clarify the rights of the person in the event that a substance is seized from the premises. The amendments ensure an appropriate balance between the powers of the inspectors and an individual’s civil rights. Amendment No. 283 seeks to rule out from the Bill the possibility of speculative visits. A great deal of effort has been expended in finding a form of words which achieves the right balance between protecting the individual’s rights and not constraining inspectors to such a degree that they could not enter unless they believed that a prescribed pesticide would be found on a particular premises. For example, we do not want to prevent inspectors entering where a poisoned bait has been found at or near several properties where pesticides are likely to be used, and it was not certain on which of those properties the pesticide would be found. With the amendment, subsection (1) would read:"““An inspector may . . . enter any premises if he has reasonable grounds to suspect that he may find there evidence that an offence is being committed under section 43””." An inspector could therefore be challenged to justify his grounds for suspicion. It should also be borne in mind that any inspectors who investigate a suspected pesticide offence will be operating according to a publicly available code of practice, setting out how inspectors should conduct themselves, and giving details of how to complain should anyone be unhappy with the inspection. I hope that Amendment No. 283, together with a code of practice along the lines of the draft which I am told has recently been lodged in the Library, will go some way towards reassuring Members of the Committee who are anxious about the possibility that landowners may be subject to harassment or unwarranted random visits. We have looked closely at the powers available to an inspector once he is on the premises. All the powers in Schedule 2 to FEPA have been scrutinised carefully to see whether any parts could be disapplied with respect to the Clause 43 pesticides offence. As a result of that further scrutiny, Amendment No. 284 removes the ability to require a statement of truth when questioning people about substances found on their premises. I accept that this power is not required, bearing in mind the power to require information already in Clause 44(1)(b). In addition, our existing pesticide inspectors, who act under the Food and Environment Protection Act 1985, have commented that in practice the power to require ““statements of truth”” is not commonly used. It was therefore decided that this power could usefully be removed. Amendment No. 285 introduces three new subsections which clarify the rights of the person in the event that a substance is seized from his premises as evidence of an offence under Clause 43, by setting out the procedure relating to its retention. This will ensure that property rights are not eroded by the investigation process. A person may make a claim to have the seized substance returned by, for example, providing evidence that he has a defence under Clause 43(3). The time frame set out in these subsections would allow for a substance to be tested to ascertain whether it contains a prescribed pesticide. If prosecution proceedings are subsequently pursued, the substance may be retained for up to 28 days after the court has determined the outcome. If proceedings are not pursued and a claim for the substances’ return is not received, they may be retained for up to 28 days after the time for bringing such proceedings has expired, and then destroyed or otherwise disposed of. Of course we appreciate the concerns over individual rights that lie behind all the non-government amendments in the group but, as a result of the further changes that we are endeavouring to introduce today, these concerns should by and large be allayed. I am grateful to the noble Earl for his thanks. In due course, I shall move the government amendments. I was asked about the time scale generally by the noble Duke, in terms of the list of pesticides to be prescribed. I am advised that ““prescribed”” is the right expression. The noble Viscount, who sits in his place on the Cross Benches with much experience, nods his head; I am delighted to have to tell the noble Lady that, on this occasion, she is wrong. I thought that she was right for a moment, I have to say. The Secretary of State may prescribe pesticides only if she is satisfied that it is necessary or expedient to do so in the interests of protecting wild birds or wild animals from harm. However, no pesticides will be banned by the Bill itself. When it is enacted, a power will be provided for the Secretary of State to make an order when the prescribed pesticide ingredients will be listed. A full consultation will be carried out before any pesticide ingredient is listed on any order, and it is likely to be nine to 12 months before it comes into place. I think the noble Duke was particularly interested in that. It is not considered appropriate to ban the possession of all pesticides for obvious reasons. Given the wide-reaching penalties available for that offence, it would be disproportionate to widen the offence in that way. It is important that there is evidence to support the prescription of any pesticide ingredient. I think that that answers the question posed by the noble Duke.