Legislative and Regulatory Reform Bill

I am honoured to follow my right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham (Mr. Redwood), who has spoken about deregulation in some depth. The Bill has two significances—the regulatory significance and the parliamentary constitutional significance. The hon. Member for Cannock Chase (Dr. Wright) said he hoped for a Queen’s Speech that contained no regulation. If he had looked at last year’s speech, he would see something far from that—it committed the Government to promoting efficiency, productivity and value for money, but also said that legislation would be introduced to streamline regulatory structures. That phrase should concern us all. When I made my maiden speech in this House, I mentioned the need for a bonfire of regulations, so it was with unbridled joy that I found myself put on to the Select Committee on Regulatory Reform, assuming it to be a Committee where we would discuss, among other things, deregulation. At my first meeting in July, Members can imagine my disappointment when I was told by the Chairman that we were allowed only to look at anything enacted by the Regulatory Reform Act 2001 and that deregulation was not part of our remit. My initial hopes were immediately dashed. We must be pretty cautious about the confidence that we can have in this Bill. Can we have more confidence in the Bill than in the Regulatory Reform Act 2001, which clearly failed to stem the tide of regulation that has become a Government hallmark? The Bill’s intention may be laudable, but it must be accompanied by a step change in the Administration’s culture and attitude. We need a determined effort to shake off the Government’s tendency to interfere, regulate and inspect every element of business activity. I acknowledge the need for protection, but it must be balanced by the need for deregulation. The Government set up a Better Regulation Task Force, a Better Regulation Executive and a Better Regulation Commission. They have as gargantuan an appetite for creating quangos as for creating regulation, but do they have an appetite for deregulation? The Bill may or may not be a step in the right direction, but does it take that radical step away from the regulation culture and provide for the deregulation that British business needs? Concerns about part 1 have already been expressed and I want to mention briefly my exchanges with the Under-Secretary in the Regulatory Reform Committee. Part 1 contains enabling powers for Ministers, by order, to reform legislation or implement the Law Commission’s recommendations. No one would argue with the Bill’s stated ambition to improve the current regulatory reform order system or to deliver non-controversial proposals for simplification. It is implicit that simplification might lead to substantive changes. When the Under-Secretary gave evidence to the Select Committee, he used the example of data sharing between Departments. Although not specified, there is an implication of additional powers to amend primary legislation, not deregulation. In the past, Acts have included gateway provisions so that information and data sharing could be done in a way approved by Parliament. Why, therefore, should we should extend the regulatory reform orders procedure in the circumstances that we are considering? The answer lies in the point that the hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Alison Seabeck) made—it revolves around the definition of ““controversial””. When the Under-Secretary gave evidence to the Select Committee, he mentioned safeguards. Does the Bill include anything that allows us to distinguish between common sense and controversial? In the Select Committee, he discussed not only ““controversial”” but ““highly controversial”” as well as ““common sense””. I made the point that one man’s definition of controversial or even highly controversial is another man’s definition of common sense. I want to ensure that the distinction is capable of assessment, tightly drawn and in the Bill. Clause 2 states that orders can amend, replace or repeal any legislation. The explanatory notes state:"““‘Replace’ means that legislation may be repealed by an order made under clause 1 and may be replaced by free-standing provision in the order.””" That is clear, if somewhat worrying. However, in evidence to the Select Committee, the Under-Secretary said something different. He stated:"““This Bill would intend to create a relatively quick method of simplifying, restating or correcting errors.””" ““Restate”” and ““replace”” are not the same. ““Restate”” implies powers to clarify legislation; it does not necessarily mean altering the substance. The explanatory notes imply one thing, but the evidence given elsewhere suggests that the Under-Secretary intended another. We all understand the Government’s wish to correct errors and omissions, but there is a worry that the Bill may lead to more poor quality legislation without proper scrutiny. There seems to be little in the Bill to protect us from that. Clause 2 will widen that scope and go a long way towards giving Ministers the general power to repeal and amend primary legislation. Like many other hon. Members, I want the Minister to reassure us that there will be a distinction between restatement and replacement, and that the tests that set out the confines of his ministerial power will in the Bill and will have substantial effect. I questioned the Minister in some depth in the Select Committee about the effects of clauses 13, 14, 15 and 16, and particularly about whether the 60-days provision was really necessary. He said that the Government had consulted with business and that 60 days might not be proportionate for considering all regulatory reform orders—RROs. I take his point, but I hope that he takes the point made at that time that the reason for the 60-day examination period was to give the House the chance to undertake proper parliamentary scrutiny of the orders. Not all the proposed procedures will allow that length of parliamentary scrutiny or, indeed, enough scrutiny at all. Many of the delays involved with RROs have nothing to do with the Committee or the parliamentary scrutiny stages. They are often caused by Departments being unable to go through the consultation stage with stakeholders beforehand or to marshal the information that is needed to go into the legislation. Indeed, the bulk of the delay is a result of those factors, rather than of the parliamentary scrutiny. The Minister spoke earlier about the Hampton report. Part 1 of the Bill will allow the Government to push forward some of the recommendations in that report—including the subsuming of the 31 national regulators into about seven—where that is not already being done under separate legislation. I have some concerns about that. The reduction from 31 to seven will consolidate the bodies involved, but it might not necessarily involve deregulating or getting rid of regulation. I would like reassurance that that reduction will bring about a major sense of deregulation. Super-regulators are no better than small regulators—they can still mean more regulation and they certainly do not guarantee a light touch. The great danger is that they are less responsive and more unwieldy, and they certainly do not listen to the needs of an industry or a sector.