National Lottery Bill

My Lords, today we are following the trail of heritage and lottery Acts from 1980 through 1993, 1997 and 1998. As noble Lords have said, by 1997 the national lottery was well into its stride. While it had been opposed, and its provisions were amended in 1997, it was accepted and today nearly everybody supports its existence. More widely, in 1997 many people were thankful that consensus politics seemed again to be an option. New Labour saw that the market had come to stay and that social justice could be combined with economic efficiency. That dramatic change in position opened up the possibilities of pluralism and of decentralisation—not just decentralisation of elected political institutions but on a much wider scale. We could hope to be freed up to pursue different solutions to social problems and not just be expected to follow centrally driven prescriptions. New Labour accepted the benefits of private sector competition. Why should matters stop there? For in the pursuit of democratic advance the role of the charitable sector, with centuries of experience behind it as an institution builder and as a focus for charitable giving and of voluntary endeavour, cannot be exaggerated. Surely with new Labour’s strategy and with the benefit of 28p in the pound from the lottery, we expected unqualified support for non-governmental charitable bodies—bodies which can go their own way within the law, and not all go in the same way either. Many charities can and do massively support health. Many charities can and do support education and the environment. They research, innovate and experiment, and when they get it wrong there are always others ready to pick up the pieces. All that was needed was to wind up the Millennium Fund, go back to four distributors and rearrange the percentages of funds distributed by the four—a rearrangement consistent with strategy and supportable by almost everybody. What do we get instead? A retreat from the strategic promise into step after step of central government control—non-departmental public bodies are part of central government, whichever way we argue the case for independence—and towards single stream decision-making. And what about the Bill? It is effectively a whitewash of decisions taken in 2002 and 2003, which were implemented in June 2004. By making BIG the distributor of half the money, those decisions erode the position of the charitable sector. They ensure that with guidance and directions BIG will implement a centralist government social agenda despite the fact that the issues we face cannot solely be tackled centrally. The reason given that it was sometimes difficult to fund decentralised charitable programmes because of prevailing legislation is unconvincing. Indeed, Clause 19 can be likened to a fig leaf. The fact is that BIG and the Secretary of State, in either order, want to do it themselves. They do not believe in charitable intermediaries. This is the heart of the matter. Pluralist policies would entail an unacceptable loss of central control. To cap it all, BIG is now to tell the other three distributors how to operate, as is proposed in Clause 36(d). It is sad that we have come to this, deluged by BIG with new programmes described in the ““now you see it, now you don’t”” language of abstract noun after abstract noun. I gloomily predict that BIG will make more and probably embarrassingly worse mistakes than ever the private charitable sector would. Finally, as a prelude to later stages I will set out the dilemma that faces anyone trying to tease out the purposes and effects of directions. There is theory behind directions, which can be briefly stated. Studies of directions, mindful that they are not subject to parliamentary scrutiny, say that they are for administrative matters. All are agreed that directions must not be unreasonable and that they may not go beyond the provisions of the Act concerned as it will be interpreted by the courts. I would be grateful if the Minister would confirm that that brief description is correct. However, when studying the proceedings in another place, that précis does not seem to be the end of the matter. There is clearly a concern that directions made will go beyond administrative matters into areas of policy and then could be in accordance with the Act only if the Act is so widely drawn as to defy proper description and debate in Parliament. I admit to being confused. Are directions a minor matter, with an element of last resort available to restrain unreasonable behaviour by bodies accountable to Parliament, or are they instruments for the development by Secretaries of State of policies beyond those that can be derived from the Act as enacted, or both? I contemplate the later stages of the Bill with scepticism and some sadness. We are being taken in the wrong direction, despite all the hopes of 1997.