Natural Environment and Rural Communities Bill

The aim of Clause 7 is to enable Natural England to enter into a management agreement,"““with any person who has an interest in land””," if influencing the way in which the land is managed would further Natural England’s general purpose. Of course, management agreements are an essential and supportive tool used to secure a wide range of objectives. They are a real mark of partnership with landowners and occupiers. In the other place, responding to a specific concern, my honourable friend the Minister for Rural Affairs gave a reassurance that the wording of this clause did not mean that those who entered into such agreements with Natural England—for example, the landowner—could bind other interests in the land by its terms and against their will—for example, those holding shooting rights or common rights. Another concern has been expressed—not in the debate today—that the use of the word ““impose”” in relation to obligations and restrictions is contrary to the spirit of partnerships and represents an imposition of Natural England’s will. That is not so. ““Impose”” is the word used in relation to obligations and restrictions in the various existing management agreement powers available to English Nature and the Countryside Agency in the relevant legislation. It is a familiar and long-standing term, and nothing is changed. To answer the noble Duke’s third question—I will come to the first two in due course—I should tell him that agreements are entered into voluntarily and any obligations or restrictions imposed by the agreement are accepted as part of the bargain. Therefore, a landowner has a choice whether to enter into a management agreement, and agreements can be reached only by mutual consent. Clause 7 harmonises the previous position, whereby Natural England’s constituent bodies had different powers, suited to their particular purposes, for entering into management agreements with land managers. That broad power covers the whole of Natural England’s purpose and so simplifies the current position by effectively integrating the existing powers. Apart from agreements and schemes wholly within Natural England’s design and remit, it is also possible that certain co-funded agri-environment agreements could be administered directly by Natural England under the power. Amendment No. 159 implies the removal from Natural England of the decision on whether a particular negotiated management agreement will further its own general purpose. The issue is left somewhat open and could invite challenge by others whose motives might serve neither the interests of Natural England nor the prospective agreement holder. The prospective holder, with the assistance of any advisers, is perfectly capable of deciding whether to make the commitment. If other persons were to intervene in a debate, resources would be wasted, agreements would be delayed and nothing would be usefully gained. The noble Duke’s first point, about which the noble Baroness, Lady Miller, was also exercised, was about the expression ““incidental powers””. Clause 7(2)(f) states:"““Contain incidental and consequential provision””." The incidental powers in Clause 7 are different to the incidental powers in Clause 13 referred to by the noble Duke. Those in Clause 7 are incidental only to the management agreement requirements themselves. There is no question of them involving borrowing money or the other items that are referred to in Clause 13, which we will debate in due course. It is a restricted use of that expression. His second question was on whether and why you must have solid reasons for management agreement. That is because the clause is an enabling power. The reasons for the management agreement will be set out elsewhere. One example is to receive an agri-environment payment. Amendment No. 160 would require that the exercise of the management agreements power by Natural England would be dependent on there being a code of practice. I do not believe that the amendment is necessary, for reasons that I shall try to explain. Apart from agri-environment agreements, English Nature already has in the region of 2,700 existing management agreements in place with landowners and managers of SSSIs. Those will remain under their current terms but by virtue of other provisions in the Bill will in future be administered by Natural England under the general enabling power for agreements. They will therefore come within the authority of the provision on transfer and will continue as before with no impact for their holders as to the terms on which they were made. Agri-environment schemes already have clear rules and procedures, and use of the existing SSSI and nature reserve management agreement powers by English Nature is governed by guidance issued by the Government in February 2001: the Guidelines on Management Agreement Payments and Other Related Matters issued under the various provisions, including Section 50 of the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981. Section 50 provides for guidance concerning SSSI and nature reserve management agreements, and by virtue of Schedule 11(94) that will in future cover use of the Clause 7 powers for those purposes. Coupled with the provisions at Clause 15 for the Secretary of State to give guidance to Natural England on the exercise of its functions, there is sufficient scope for advising or influencing the way in which Natural England will exercise its powers to enter into management agreements. We do not think that a further requirement for a code of practice would be helpful. Amendment No. 161 would remove the provision for incidental and consequential provisions; I have attempted to cover that already. Amendment No. 162 would remove a critical provision from Clause 7. It is essential that agreements can be secured for the necessary duration if they are to produce the desired outcomes, some of which may take considerable time to emerge. That is particularly so where significant commitments are entered into and perhaps significant capital works are supported upfront with public funds. That is true for English Nature agreements and the co-funded agri-environment agreements, where the normal minimum term for such agreements, as stipulated by EU rules, is five years. The normal default position is that an agreement continues—the noble Duke asked about this—should the agreement holder relinquish his interests in the land to another. Clause 7(3) makes it abundantly clear that, unless the agreement says otherwise, it will be binding on successors to the interests of the original agreement holder. That is not new; the same principle is already enshrined in the management agreement provision in Section 39 of the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, and experience of the past 25 years has given us no grounds to review that position. Subsection (3) again provides that Natural England will have the same ability to enforce the terms of the agreement against the successors as it would have against the original agreement holder. Once that continuity is made clear, it is implicit that Natural England must also honour its obligations to the successors, who will have available to them any beneficial terms contained in the agreement that were available to the original agreement holder. I have done my best to answer the important points made in this brief debate.