London Olympic Games and Paralympic Games Bill

Those checks and balances are there and I do not underestimate their significance, but I know who takes the rap if things go wrong. This body will be ultimately accountable to the Secretary of State, which is why the body must be accountable for its decisions. I accept entirely the representations made by the noble Lord, Lord Glentoran and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, that it would be absurd if we pitched the level of accountability too low. We are concerned to identify powers and structures in the Bill. I make clear that those are largely reserve powers for the Secretary of State. They need to be. She needs to be mentioned in the Bill because she is ultimately responsible to Parliament for the work of the body. She needs to know just what the board is doing. One might say, ““Can’t the ODA be trusted to make additional appointments?””, which is the issue at stake in the noble Baroness’s Amendments Nos. 7 and 8. Let us be absolutely clear, the ODA has considerable power. The Secretary of State has appointed the original board. But are Members suggesting that the delivery authority could be free to make additional appointments without any sanction from anyone? Of course it is to be trusted, but if things went wrong, if injudicious appointments were made, only one person would be accountable for that. It would not be the chair going before a Select Committee or national audit. Responsibility would be with the Secretary of State who had appointed that individual. There must be a reserve position. Is it then suggested that the Secretary of State will interfere in every decision? Of course not. That is not the concept at all, but in legislation we need to make it absolutely clear that the ODA in exercising its power has these areas of final responsibility. It has to be accountable to Ministers and to Parliament. Otherwise, we are going against prudence in suggesting that we can take away the reserve responsibility of the Secretary of State and say, ““Well, we have created a public body, and it has been appointed by the Secretary of State. We know from all public bodies throughout the whole history of our country that nothing can ever go wrong. It is therefore not necessary for that body to be answerable to the Secretary of State””. Such a position cannot seriously be maintained. If the noble Baroness is saying that the concern here is that the Secretary of State will involve herself or her officials in the minutiae of the operation of the ODA, I hope that we are able to occupy our civil servants in the department much more intelligently than in supervising travel chits for ODA members. But given the huge expenditures for which the ODA will be responsible, ultimate accountability for that expenditure must rest with the Secretary of State. Common sense should prevail at each level, and I take it that at this point we are arguing a point of principle. Let me take another illustration. If the Olympic Delivery Authority appoints individuals to carry out valuable but nonetheless lowly tasks in the organisation, neither the Secretary of State nor anyone acting on her behalf in the department will be interested in pay and conditions at that level; of course not. But surely it is not seriously contended that the pay and conditions of the chair and board members of such a significant body should not be a matter for the Secretary of State. I do not know of a comparable public body, bearing responsibilities of this kind, in which a Secretary of State would not take a real interest in the level of remuneration. How would you know what you are pitching for in the market in the quality of the individuals you seek if you are not interested in pay and conditions? I am sorry if Members on the other side of the Committee feel that this is a bit demeaning to the Secretary of State, but it is not bad management practice—here I concede to the greater management expertise of many noble Lords—to care a great deal about the pay and conditions of the staff one employs. It is a principle of effective corporate operation. I do not have the slightest hesitation in suggesting that the Secretary of State should concern herself with those matters at the highest level. I concede entirely the point that the pitch must be right, but we are talking about legislation. If we remove the provision, the Secretary of State will have no responsibility. All I seek to do to sustain my case is to point out that there are circumstances in which it is clear that this responsibility and the need to be answerable to the Secretary of State will be necessary. Finally, Amendments Nos. 9 and 10 would remove the Secretary of State’s power to issue a direction to the ODA. I should point out that this is a reserve power. We hope that it will never be used. I am certain in my own mind that the operation of the ODA would have to be in dire straits if such a power had to be used. It would suggest a breakdown in trust and of operational capacity that presented us with very real difficulties. But if things ultimately went wrong, the Secretary of State is answerable to Parliament and to the people of this country for the successful operation of this body. Given that, she must have a reserve power. I accept that much can be made of the fact that because the Secretary of State appears in this guise—her function would be deleted by these amendments—it may look like the exercise of overweening power. That is not so, rather it is the exercise of proper accountability. No one would suggest that the ODA could possibly function if it did not have significant power over and responsibility for its own operations. Moreover, the quality of the people the we seek to appoint will guarantee that. Equally, the Secretary of State is ultimately responsible for the body and that is why she is listed in the Bill.