Racial and Religious Hatred Bill

I am going to make some further headway. It is important that I do so to give other hon. Members ample opportunity to contribute to the debate. I should make it clear that actual evidence that hatred had been stirred up is not required for the offence to be made out. That is reflected in section 27(2A) in part 3 of the Public Order Act 1986 and section 29L(3) in new part 3A. I note that Opposition Members have tabled an amendment that would remove that provision from our proposed wording. However, it seems self-evident, given that the offences that we propose are based on intent or recklessness, that the consequence of such activity does not have to be realised for the offence to be committed. It would be nonsensical if one had to produce someone in court who said that they had been stirred up to hatred in order for the offence to be proved. I come now to the area that has probably been the source of most concern, which in view of all the comments that have been made means that we could be in for an interesting few minutes—the whole issue of freedom of expression. I stand by the reassurances that I have previously given to the House. I still believe that the Bill as originally drafted would not have prevented anyone from telling jokes, preaching and teaching or engaging in robust discussion about religion or belief. However, I promised, particularly in response to my hon. Friend the Member for Cannock Chase (Dr. Wright) and others, that if suitable wording could be found I would be in favour of a clear statement in the Bill. Proposed section 29K of new part 3A contains such a statement and makes it clear that discussion, debate, criticism, expression of antipathy, abuse, insult, ridicule or attempts to convert people from one faith to another will not be covered by the Bill unless the requirements of the offences as regards intent or recklessness are satisfied. It also makes it crystal clear—