Natural Environment and Rural Communities Bill

moved Amendment No. 21:"Page 44, line 14, after ““appointed”” insert ““following an interview and open selection procedure,””" The noble Baroness said: In moving this amendment, I will also speak to Amendments Nos. 22, 23, 26, 31, 36, 43, 44, 49, 53 and 98—quite a batting order. I was not minded to be difficult, but one of the things that is taxing our minds is the whole question of how a non-departmental government body is remote from the Government. One of the key things to do is look in the schedules. As members of the Committee will see, the Secretary of State has an immense amount of power within these schedules to appoint members to the board, chairmen and staff. I will briefly go through the amendments as best I can. On Amendment No. 21, it is the stated policy of this Government to make all public appointments through the commissioner. The intention should, however, be placed in the appropriate places on the face of the Bill. If that is not done, it will only require a statement of the change of policy to allow senior appointments in highly influential positions to become a gift of the Minister or the outcome of a political debate. The changes to be initiated by this Bill will have the effect of reducing the amount of the cross-tension between bodies involved in the running of the countryside. By cutting the number of bodies that have equal influence over what happens the Government have, in effect, reduced the amount of decision between various departments and the agencies. The role, for example, of the chairman of Natural England will be even greater than that of the existing chairman of English Nature. The Bill should safeguard appointments to such positions by including the words which would give effect to the current policy. On Amendment No. 22, I understand that the Government intend Natural England and the Commission for Rural Communities to be these arm’s-length bodies. They are envisaged as demonstrating a great deal of independence from the Government. The appointment of the chairman is clearly in the hands of the Secretary of State. The remaining appointments are to be regulated by the Commissioner for Public Appointments, so the shortlist will, as it were, conform to the rules of engagement. However, the final decision on other board members should be in the hands of the chairman and his advisors. We have tabled these amendments, relating to the maximum 10-year period permissible for any board member but, as things stand, Natural England and the Commission for Rural Communities could each be run for many years by up to 16 people all appointed by the Secretary of State herself. We feel that such a situation could compromise any claims to independence, and might inhibit the ability of the chairman to run his board effectively. The commission in particular will be concerned with ensuring that rural funding is put to the correct use. That funding will now come almost entirely from the rural development agencies, with only national projects being supported directly by Defra. The chairman of the board of the commission will need to be competent, effective, knowledgeable and hard-working, which I am sure that he or she will be, and the commission will need to be a cohesive, whole operation, run on a basis of mutual respect and trust. The duty to ensure such a position must rest with the chairman and his should be the final approval for membership of that board. Much the same qualities will be demanded of the board of Natural England, and the chairman will have a similar need to establish and maintain a tightly knit organisation. To conserve, enhance and manage the natural environment for the benefit of present and future generations is a daunting task, which will not be made any easier if the board is not a first-class team. The emphasis is on the team and how good that team is, as I have no doubt that the selection process will throw up those who are highly qualified to do the job—and we obviously all hope so. The final selection must be seen in the same light as that of an expedition leader or captain of a round-the-world yacht. In those circumstances, compatibility and having a person to fill each team role and function is considered vitally important and, if we got it wrong, it could be very difficult. Amendment No. 23 and related amendments are consequential amendments, which are perhaps unnecessary in two respects. First, if the Minister agrees that the final selection of board members should be done by the chairman, he may wish to consult the Secretary of State, but we suggest that that should not be done the other way round. Secondly, if the selection process is of the quality expected, it is surely axiomatic that those appointed to the board and commission should have experience and demonstrate a capability for the type of work that they will be required to do. Is it truly conceivable that the Commissioner for Public Appointments does not have as part of his remit that appointees should be fit for the purpose? I turn to Amendment No. 26. The independence of any board or commission is surely highly questionable, when the members of which are appointed by the Secretary of State, the chairman of which is then chosen by the Secretary of State and the deputy chairman of which is also selected by the Secretary of State. It casts doubt from the very beginning on the trust that the Secretary of State places in her chairman and in the strength of her intention to remain at arm’s length. When, however, the Bill lays down that having consulted said chairman on the selection of remaining board members, the Secretary of State may choose without consultation the deputy chairman, one can be in little doubt that the Secretary of State means to have a strong and ongoing influence in all matters relating to the conduct of the board and the commission. We should prefer the chairman to appoint the members of his team in conjunction with the Secretary of State, and they then select from their midst his deputy. Amendment No. 31 is a probing amendment. The Bill refers to whether a person has had his estate sequestrated in Scotland. Presumably, sequestration does not apply in Wales, which has the same arrangements as England. Would proceedings in Tenerife, the Bahamas, Florida or wherever be regarded in the same way? That is the obvious question that follows the tabling of this amendment. Have we here an oblique indication that the board of Natural England might be staffed by Scottish landowners, or might it be possible that it will be served by someone whose main home is overseas—or do the Government see that the board should have among its members people from England who will decide matters appertaining to England and not Scotland or Wales? When we come to the amendments relating to Amendment No. 36, noble Lords will be pleased to know that I shall not refer to them in full again. Amendment No. 36, which would leave out ““pensions””, is a probing amendment. I am quite mystified by this provision. Unless the Minister intends the word to mean something other than is normally meant, I cannot agree that the board of Natural England should be empowered to pay a pension to any of its members. I do not know whether that is already so—but I cannot think of a board whose board members, rather than staff, are paid pensions. I was intrigued by that. Paragraph 11(b) enables the board to pay sums,"““towards provision for the payment of pensions””." Empowerment to pay pensions to existing members, however, implies that the board will take over responsibility from another pension provider. Thus someone joining the board who, while still relatively young, is entitled to a pension from the police or Armed Forces, might be covered by this provision—or is the Minister contemplating the possibility that the board might attract applications from senior civil servants or ex-politicians who would be entitled to draw a pension while fulfilling their contract with Natural England? The idea that the board might take on the responsibility for paying the pension of someone from the private sector is extremely far-fetched, but I suppose that if the permission were there it could happen. On Amendment No. 43, both board and commission are intended to be non-departmental public bodies. As the Bill stands, however, the Secretary of State will be able to appoint the chairman, the deputy chairman, the remaining members and the chief executive. That could amount to 17 people in each organisation. I am no statistician, but if there were two members under 50, 12 under 60 and three older than that, if three left before they reached 65 or two of the over-60s stayed until they were 72, the appointing Secretary of State could be responsible for more than half of each of the governing bodies a decade later. I am sure that that is not what is envisaged. Under which circumstances would sub-paragraph (3) operate? Who would decide that the chief executive should be appointed by the Secretary of State? Would it come from the Cabinet, would the Secretary of State simply claim the duty, or would the chairman turn to the Secretary of State rather than trust the board? That single line in the Bill poses more questions than it answers. Amendment No. 44 requires a shorter explanation, for which I am thankful. The amendment should be read along with paragraph 14 on page 49 of the Bill. I understand that unless some such wording is in the Bill, neither body will be able to employ staff, despite paragraph 13(1) in both schedules. Perhaps the Minister will simply confirm that no intention is implicit in this permission. Amendment No. 53 is a probing amendment. Why does the Bill lay down a separate rule for payment of the increases in superannuation payments? Why does it not simply say that the board will be responsible for omitting all such dues? Why, too, is the payment of such sums not apparently covered in paragraph 15(b)? Finally, Amendment No. 98 is another probing amendment. It is my understanding that any body corporate is bound by a number of Acts which require it to meet financial, employment, competition and many other standards. In all cases, that will render them liable to inspection by Customs and Excise, the Health and Safety Executive, the Audit Commission and maybe a host of others. What will be the nature of the Secretary of State’s inquiry? What type of person will inspect and make copies? What explanations will be sought and why? How often can that intrusion occur? Will the outcome be made available to the chairman? Will the Secretary of State publicise the exercise, the reasons for it and the results? I apologise enormously that the amendments were all grouped together but they are so interlinked. I beg to move.