Influenza Pandemic (S&T Report)

My Lords, I commend the noble Lord, Lord Broers, and other members of the Science and Technology Committee for their report on pandemic influenza. It is a timely piece of work and is helpful in highlighting many of the uncertainties and challenges which make contingency planning in this area extremely difficult. It is important, as a number of your Lordships have recognised, that we recognise the uncertainties and that they are to some extent inevitable. My noble friend Lord Giddens set that out very eloquently. The Government will formally respond to the conclusions and recommendations in the report in due course. In the mean time I should like to respond to as many of the issues as possible. I just gently point out to noble Lords that I have about one-tenth of the time that they had to make those points. I will do my very best. I will even try to answer some of my noble friend Lord Winston’s questions, which he seems to think I have taken delight in not answering in the past. The issue of NHS deficits was raised on one or two occasions. Fifty per cent of the deficits are in 4 per cent of trusts. Last year’s deficit on the NHS was 0.5 per cent of the total spend. We need to keep a sense of proportion about some of those issues. I turn to the outbreak of avian flu in Turkey. The committee’s report helpfully distinguishes between avian influenza and the possibility of a human influenza pandemic. Although the report primarily considers a possible pandemic, it is worth noting as others have done some of the recent developments regarding avian flu. Since the publication of the committee’s report, there have been a number of human cases of H5N1 avian influenza associated with an outbreak in poultry in Turkey. While this is a worrying development, it needs to be kept in perspective. I repeat that avian flu remains primarily a disease of birds, not of people. The situation in Turkey is still being investigated by international experts, but tests carried out by the Institute for Medical Research here in the UK have shown that there has been a small mutation in the virus, which means that it has developed a greater affinity for human cells. However, I must stress that this does not mean that the virus has developed the ability to be transmitted from human to human and there is still no confirmed evidence of human-to-human transmission. Several further mutations would need to take place before this could happen. That is certainly the scientific advice that has been given to me and which I now pass on to the House. The institute has said that this development brings the risk of an influenza pandemic a small step closer. These developments do not affect the WHO alert level and the tests have also shown that the virus remains sensitive to antivirals, including Tamiflu, and previous generations of antivirals. The Department of Health and Defra are closely monitoring the situation in Turkey and any changes in the situation will be reflected in the Government’s planning for dealing with an outbreak of avian influenza in this country. We already have a comprehensive contingency plan in place to contain any outbreak of avian influenza on these shores and to protect those individuals who might have close contact with infected birds. Defra has also utilised a wide range of communication channels to ensure that its biosecurity and surveillance messages are effectively delivered to the poultry industry. Events in Turkey have served to remind us, if we ever needed reminding, of why the Government regard planning to combat a human influenza pandemic as one of their top emergency planning priorities. As the committee’s report recognises, it will probably not be possible to prevent a pandemic occurring, but with good planning and preparation we can reduce its impact on the health of our population. To that end, a considerable amount of work has been going on across central and local government and the NHS to prepare for a pandemic. The Secretary of State for Health has been designated as the lead Minister for pandemic flu, and the Cabinet Committee on Influenza Pandemic Planning (MISC 32) has been created to co-ordinate cross-government work. This work is being driven forward as a matter of priority and has already delivered significant improvements in the level of preparedness in this country. It is true that we have not introduced a Minister for homeland security, and I apologise to the noble Baroness, Lady Byford, for that—that was meant to be ironic. I want to make a number of points related to these issues. Several noble Lords asked about preparedness at the local level. Risk assessments at the local and regional levels have consistently identified pandemic flu as one of the key hazards. Central government have issued guidance on the implications of this for maintaining business continuity and a further series of guidance notes will be issued in the near future. Local authorities have been working with the NHS and other partners in local and regional resilience forums to make preparation. Good progress has been made, but this is a complex and difficult problem, and more work needs to be done. However, it is being taken forward as a priority. A number of noble Lords raised issues on our preparedness in relation to food supplies. Despite what the committee says, the Government have had extensive contacts with food retailers regarding a flu pandemic. They initiated a review of food chain resilience with them and with other stakeholders back in June 2005. Defra’s food chain emergency liaison group meets regularly to discuss emergency planning for dealing with disruptions to food supplies as well as food chain resilience issues. The group comprises representatives from all key sectors in the food chain, including the British Retail Consortium, which represents food retailers. So we have done a lot of work in those areas. A number of noble Lords have raised the issue of whether we need to appoint a new Cabinet-level Minister with specific responsibilities for contingency and disaster planning. We have a Cabinet Minister involved in these issues—indeed we have several—and the Cabinet Office co-ordinates resilience across government under the Security and Intelligence Co-ordinator, Sir Richard Mottram. The Cabinet Office takes on this co-ordinating role in all areas of policy. As I have said, the Secretary of State for Health is clearly in the lead in planning for a flu pandemic and the Home Secretary continues to have overall responsibility for safety and security. We have a robust model—