Family Justice

: Precisely. The hon. Gentleman points to the anomalies, as did the Select Committee. The rules about secrecy and the restriction on reporting and attending family courts are incredibly complex. For a start, that means that they are often breached by accident. Also, it shows that there cannot be huge points of principle involved. Otherwise—the hon. Gentleman rightly alluded to this—why is it possible to report cases that are subject to anonymity in the Court of Appeal and the High Court, but not in the lower courts? Part of the problem is that the rules change when one goes up to appeal and sideways between different proceedings, so they are complex. It is not just that, as the hon. Gentleman said, the rules are complicated and inconsistent; there are two further reasons why the trajectory away from secrecy to openness is right. First, as is highlighted in the Committee's report, there is a sense in which the secrecy restricts individuals who are parties to the case. It might deter people from seeking the help that they need, if they are not able to talk to people about their case. The judgment of Mr. Justice Munby in Re B reminded everybody that, before we changed the rules in response to that case, constituents were not allowed to come to see Members of Parliament about such cases. No woman was allowed to come in and say, ““Social services have applied to take my children away,”” because she would have been breaching the law, although it happened all the time as a matter of course, because people wanted help and support. They wanted to share their concerns and air their sense of injustice, but the law prohibited that, which was obviously ridiculous and wrong. We were all fully aware of the experience of a woman coming in and saying, ““My husband's violent, yet the court have ordered contact.”” I am also aware of men coming in saying, ““I never laid a finger on her. The child loves me, but I've been denied contact.”” However, all that was unlawful under the rules, which were honoured more in the breach than in the observance. The Munby judgment has precipitated a change in that regard. However, it is not only the issue of who individual parties can speak to that makes openness imperative; there is also the matter of public confidence. The courts and their work have been overlaid with accusation and counter-accusation. For example, there is the accusation that the courts too readily grant contact to violent fathers. However, there is no sense in which anybody can think of anything other than a few anecdotes, because everything is, by definition, secret and private. The courts then face the opposite accusation—that fathers are denied contact. However, there is no sense in which anybody can rebut that criticism; they cannot know whether, or to what degree, it is right or wrong, or whether everything is perfectly fine. All the judgments are being made with the utmost sensitivity and common sense and on the basis of the evidence, but because they are made behind closed doors, it is impossible to counter the accusations that the courts are not doing justice in the way that we, by law, ask them to. Openness therefore goes hand in hand with public confidence in the justice system. Justice must not only be done, but be seen to be done. It must not be seen to be naming the child or the family, but it must be seen to be done. With that in mind, we have already changed the rules on Members of Parliament. My noble Friend Baroness Ashton, who takes the lead on these matters in our Department, has announced a public consultation on the issue, prompted by the Select Committee. She intends to publish that consultation in late February or early March, and it is already being worked on. Thereafter, there will be the possibility of rule changes or further legislation. The judiciary are well involved in the discussions, and I am sure that progress can be made. Of course, it is open to the judiciary to introduce that bit of openness now, under their inherent jurisdiction to decide what goes on in their courts and using their powers to make orders under the various statutes. I therefore think that we shall see openness in the future. The Select Committee has been pivotal in this process and will no doubt remain so. I find it difficult to disentangle and deal separately with the questions of enforcement and delay. On enforcement, public confidence and justice reside not in a court order being made, but in that order being carried out. Therefore, public confidence will not attach to a justice system if it makes the right order, but that order is not carried out. We are in no doubt about the importance of enforcement. The Bill will deal with some enforcement issues and with the remedies that will be available to the courts. Those remedies will stop short of imprisonment, but they will add to the courts' ability to ensure that orders are enforced. One of the key issues raised earlier was the frustration of orders as a result of delays. Such delays mean that it becomes more difficult as time goes by to make the order that one might have made had the case come to court earlier. Prompt hearings and enforcement therefore go absolutely hand in hand. The current president of the family division is greatly concerned that there should be an urgent hearing to review a case within 10 working days when contact has not taken place as ordered. The next question is how often that happens. What matters is not what is in the guidance or the orders, but what happens. We will get back to the Committee in due course about the effect of that guidance and how much it can be kept to, which is critical.