National Insurance Contributions Bill

My hon. Friend, a distinguished member of the Standing Committee that considered the Bill, is right to draw attention to that point, and I hope that he will have the chance to expand on it in his own speech in due course. I find it hard to believe that the Minister will not accept the change proposed in amendment No. 14 so that subsection (2) would read:"““Those regulations may be made so as to have retrospective effect if it””" is reasonable"““in consequence of the retrospective tax provision, for the regulations to have that effect.””" That would mean that the judge of that reasonableness would ultimately be the courts; it would not be left to the Treasury to decide whether the measure was expedient. It is hard to think of any circumstances in which the Treasury would not think it expedient to legislate in favour of getting more revenue, however just or unjust that might be. That is the big problem with the wording at present; it encourages the Treasury to say, as we often hear from the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that if something will generate revenue it is expedient and must be good, irrespective of how fair or unfair it might be. I have given the Minister a safety net. If she believes that the Treasury should continue to be the judge, it would, under my amendment No. 15, have to satisfy the test of reasonableness rather than of expediency. I hope that she will accept my amendment No. 14 but if she thinks that would cause great loopholes that the Treasury would not be able to close, as an alternative she could fall back on amendment No. 15, which would still give the Treasury the say, but on grounds of reasonableness rather than expediency. My right hon. Friends the Members for Bromley and Chislehurst and for East Yorkshire (Mr. Knight) have been consulting the dictionary. In preparation for this short debate, I resorted to ““Words and Phrases Legally Defined””, a useful reference for legislators. It draws attention to decided case law in the UK and the common law jurisdictions and sets out how particular phrases have been interpreted in the courts, which enables us as legislators to decide which phrases and words we want to incorporate in our own legislation. In a Canadian case, ““Words and Phrases”” refers to the ““Shorter Oxford English Dictionary”” definition of expedient as"““advantageous; fit, proper, or suitable to the circumstances of the case: Useful, politic, as opposed to just or right””." I realise that my right hon. Friend the Member for East Yorkshire was referring to the ““Concise Oxford Dictionary””, but with the greatest respect, I think that the ““Shorter Oxford Dictionary””, which is in fact longer, sets out the definition more clearly and precisely. In the case of Health Care Developers Inc. v. Newfoundland, in 1996, there is a reference to whether the terms of the Public Tender Act were wide. The conclusion is that, due to the use of the word ““expedient””, the Act is extremely widely drawn. Similarly, a reference in the ““New Zealand Law Reports”” to a case in 1998 notes:"““‘Expedient’ is frequently used in statutes . . . While there may be shades of meaning of the word, depending on the context, reference to standard dictionaries brings out its basic meaning . . . Clearly, ‘expedient’ as used in the section””—" of the New Zealand Criminal Justice Act 1985—"““sets a lower threshold than ‘necessary’, a conclusion reinforced by the consideration that the legislature often employs the alternative standards of ‘necessary or expedient’““." That is especially material, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst referred to the statute that set up the Customs and Excise commissioners and the powers to deal with what was ““necessary or expedient””. However, we notice that the words ““necessary or”” have been left out of the Bill. If the very commissioners are set up under arrangements that enable them to do that which is necessary or expedient, why should the Treasury be given even greater power, without the inclusion of the necessity test?