Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (Contingency Planning) Regulations 2005

I, too, thank the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Chesterton, for moving this consideration of the contingency planning regulations. I have to admit that I was fairly disappointed when I read them. Perhaps that is just because I have not read enough regulations in my short time in your Lordships’ House. Of course, it is impossible to make regulations for every possible contingency for different local situations and the changing nature of the contingencies to be considered. But as you read the regulations in parts they are somewhat vague. I looked on them as a checklist for any emergency planner in any category 1 or category 2 responders organisation and for those who are involved in emergency planning. Let me give an example of the vagueness. As a category 2 responder considering whether you should attend a meeting, the regulations state that you must attend that meeting but only if it is reasonably practical. Either it is important that category 2 responders attend if they are invited, or we just say that they should attend if it is convenient. There are other ambiguities. For example, the section that refers to informing the public is counteracted by the section that says not to alarm the public, but there is no guidance on how to balance those two things. There is also the question that was addressed at some length when considering the Bill; namely, the vexed issue of the role of voluntary organisations. There is a very welcome section on how voluntary organisations, when relevant, should be engaged, but there is also a series of factors that are a way of checking-off and finding a reason not to engage voluntary organisations. Again, order and counter-order seems to be the way that it goes. As time goes on, we are ever more conscious of the possibility of major disasters; we have seen so many this year already. We need clear lines of leadership. I have some sympathy with the noble Baroness’s views on leadership. One can debate the mechanism. The regulations address leadership quite well when we look at London, which is very much in the focus of the regulations. But for the rest of the country there is a series of ways of appointing leaders, without giving alternatives if those people are not available on the day. During the discussions of the Bill, I continually raised what seemed to me to be extraordinary; namely, that our major resource for civil contingencies—the Ministry of Defence—was not tasked at all. I notice that it is excluded even in the interpretation of intelligence services where all of our intelligence services are listed with the exception of the Defence Intelligence Service, which would be able to give advice in certain areas of terrorist attacks and would have various assets available. The wider question is how these regulations engage the defence assets that we have, whether we are talking about the poor response in Louisiana—the lack of helicopters going there quickly—or Pakistan. The defence assets are important. We need to get them engaged at an early stage in our contingency planning. Overall, as a checklist, this is a useful document, if somewhat ambiguous in places. There is a lack of evaluation requirements, which are important. There is no mention of the frequency or scale of the sort of various training exercises that are required. There are also uncertainties about the regions beyond London. We need to do more. I notice that in, I think, today’s Guardian, another leaked government document says that there was some worry internally in Downing Street about civil contingencies as they affect terrorism turning into talking shops rather than delivering action. In this document we have a recipe for a number of talking-shops. They are important, but we must ensure that somewhere we have contingency plans that give confidence that we will get delivery. I welcome the chance to look at the regulations, but this is not the answer to disasters in the future. It can be an aid to it, so we will support it.