Interception of Communications (Admissibility of Evidence) Bill [HL]

My Lords, although I intend to speak from my past, not current, experience, I should say, whether relevant or not, that I am deputy chairman of Cable & Wireless, a telecommunications company in the United Kingdom. I am delighted to follow the noble and learned Lord, Lord Ackner, who has made a devastating contribution to the proceedings here today. He has allowed me to be briefer than I intended to be. The words of the interception commissioner, as expanded upon in his letter to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Ackner, should be read carefully by all who are interested in this subject. The proposition is superficially attractive. It seems to some people to be self-evident that it will facilitate the conviction of some evil and dangerous people, whether terrorists or organised criminals. To the outside eye, it can look sensible if we can, through some sophisticated supervised sieve, make available in court what can appear on the face of it to be damning evidence of wrongdoing. But that is a superficial attraction. The issue is much more complex and the downside of this proposal outweighs the benefits that it might bring. Indeed, the proposal is mistaken, misguided and, in certain circumstances, dangerous. Those of us who have held the highest offices of state—I was Secretary of State for Defence—become part of a unique and tight intelligence community. We therefore become privy to knowledge of, and responsibility for, a wide range of methods for collecting sensitive and secret information. I find that is a sobering and onerous burden to accept at the time and to carry it to the end of our lives. From my experience, I pay tribute to the professionalism, tenacity, ingenuity and, very often, sheer gut courage of so many of those in British intelligence services who safeguard our security. They deserve, and should get, our gratitude and commendation, and when, as in this case, they have a unanimous opinion, we should pay careful attention to what they say. I take seriously my obligation to protect both what I have come to know in the Ministry of Defence in the British Government and the other information and intelligence, including that from foreign sources, to which I had access while serving as Secretary-General of NATO. I shall share no secrets with the House today, although from my long years in the House of Commons, I recall that it was usually quite safe to disclose the most sensitive information in Parliament, because you could be absolutely sure that no one was listening to you. I just wanted to make a couple of points to the House and to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, in particular, who also knows more than he can share with the House today, to show that this is a profoundly misguided and possibly counterproductive route to go down. The methods used to intercept communications are varied and many of them ingenious. All are legal, but many are very sensitive indeed. If those methods were to become known, however restricted the audience was that got to know of them, those sources would be compromised and, in many cases, probably ended. Not only that, but the lives and safety of those involved in such communications methods might be compromised or threatened. I am not an expert in English law, but the principle of discovery is built into that law and our interrogative and confrontational system. If one element of evidence is put into court, it will be simply a matter of time, logic or even fairness that all the intercepted information is placed outside the protected world where it had previously resided.