Terrorism Bill

I will touch on that issue, which relates to the report from which I took the wording of my amendment, in a moment. That report was by the high-level working group established by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in preparation for the 60th anniversary world summit. The group addressed the problem of defining terrorism legally, politically and specifically. It concluded—I am paraphrasing, but I hope fairly—that actions of states such as war, occupation and genocide are already covered by international law in one way or another. Attempts to agree international laws on terrorism, excluding specific offences, have so far always foundered on what has been described as the freedom fighter problem—one man’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter. In the past, that problem most obviously preoccupied the UN in respect of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, the Israeli occupation since the ’67 war, and so on. The high-level working group made a very persuasive point. It said that there should be some international norms, and it approached the issue not from the political basis of the action that might be carried out by civilian or non-state combatants, but according to the type of action that is acceptable. It said that it does not matter what the cause is—deliberately targeting civilians is wrong. That is the basis on which it produced the wording that I have used in my amendment. There are two reasons to commend this definition to the House today. First, although it is not an intergovernmental agreement, it did come from a legitimate international process set up under the auspices of the UN. Secondly, it deals with the problem that this House has been wrestling with for the past few days, and for that reason it is to be greatly preferred, in dealing with the offences under consideration, to the Government’s definition. Any Member of this House should be prepared to argue with their constituents that deliberately setting out to kill civilians and non-combatants—be it in Burma, Chechnya, Kashmir, Palestine or any future trouble spot—is wrong, no matter what the history, grievance or repression. That is why the wording of my amendment has been drawn directly from the working group report. I acknowledge that my amendment is not perfect. First, it should certainly apply to clause 21—the proscription clause—which was discussed earlier. Secondly, a number of colleagues have raised with me the fair criticism that we cannot appear to endorse attacks by terrorist groups on British troops, or attacks on those of our allies with whom British troops may be serving, for example, under UN mandate or under the auspices of NATO, as in the Kosovan war. That is an issue, but it is perfectly clear—I have examined it in some detail—that there are a number of ways in which we could bring within the terms of this Bill such attacks on British troops and other troops serving the UN. It is true that some extremely unpleasant—and, indeed, evil—acts that might take place around the world would not be covered by the definition in my amendment. We should recognise that openly as a problem, but the debate has shown that a much bigger problem exists with the way that terrorism is defined for the purposes of clauses 1 and 17. That definition is so broad that it encompasses every act of political violence, even the most trivial. I see no way to avoid the truth that the House will have to come to a compromise in this matter. We must find a compromise between the all-embracing definition, which throws up huge problems, and a definition that excludes some matters that there is no doubt that all hon. Members oppose.