Terrorism Bill

Amendment No. 33 stands in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Erith and Thamesmead (John Austin). I would also like to say a few words about the other amendments in the group. Amendment No. 33 covers an issue that I raised on Second Reading. I refer hon. Members to paragraph 19 on pages 4 and 5 of the explanatory notes to the Bill, which makes it clear that a person would be regarded as committing a terrorist act if they did something"““for the benefit of a proscribed organisation.””" I shall repeat the example that I gave on Second Reading. If an hon. Member, either directly or through intermediaries, urged Hamas to desist from its military and terrorist activities and to get involved instead in the democratic process in the west bank and Gaza—this is not a theoretical point; these arguments are taking place in Hamas at the moment—I would suggest that that activity would be for the benefit of a proscribed organisation. Hamas is definitely a terrorist organisation, and it is definitely proscribed under existing legislation. My reading of the Bill as it stands is that such an act would become unlawful. That is ludicrous. When I put this to my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary on Second Reading, he was very definite in his response. He said:"““First, it would be to the benefit of that organisation, and secondly, it would not be criminal.””—[Official Report, 26 October 2005; Vol. 438, c. 339.]" I appreciate his giving me that assurance, but I still do see that in the Bill. It is what is in the Bill that is important, so I would appreciate it if he would tell me what he can do to clarify this matter, perhaps on Report. The main question that we are dealing with in regard to this group of amendments is the definition of terrorism. Yesterday, I was struck by the speech made by my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham, South (Alan Simpson), when he read out a passage from ““Homage to Catalonia””. That book also had a major impact on my political thinking, particularly when I became a student in the early 70s. Within a month of my going to York university, Salvador Allende’s Government in Chile was overthrown by the Pinochet regime. Throughout the 70s, while I was at university, I found out a lot about what was going on in Chile. Exiled Chilean students came to my university, and I got to know them and learned a lot from them about what people were going through in Chile at that time. People were being herded into football stadiums; there were death squads. Some of those students said that they wanted to take up arms against the fascist regime, but I could not regard them as terrorists. However, under the definition in the Bill, they would be. These amendments have to be considered in the context of clause 1. It would have been wrong if those people who opposed the Pinochet regime in Chile had murdered civilians. That would have been wrong even then. Even if they had urged such action, I would certainly have argued with them and disagreed with them, but whether I would have wanted to criminalise them is another matter. However, clause 1 as it stands would criminalise them. If we are going to have such provisions in clause 1, it is essential that, when we define terrorism, we draw a distinction between actions taken against civilians and non-combatants—which are not justifiable—and actions taken against the forces of a regime similar to the Pinochet regime. That seems to be the crux of the amendment of my right hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Itchen (Mr. Denham). One of the criticisms of the amendment is that it would not regard attacks on British troops as terrorist, which is true. In my view, however, anybody in this country who urged attacks on British troops would be guilty of at least incitement and probably also treason. The fact that someone is attacking troops does not of itself make the attack terrorism. It might make it unjustifiable, abhorrent or treasonable, but it does not necessarily make it terrorism. Let us remember that every regime in the world that has faced some kind of insurgency—the South African one springs to mind—always describes forces that take action against it, if they are not regular forces, as terrorist. While we might want to tidy up provisions to deal with matters regarding British troops, we must not get ourselves into a situation whereby we give succour to oppressive regimes who want to describe people as terrorists not because of what they do, not because they target civilians and not because they are involved in genocide, but simply because they oppose them. Such a tightening of the definition of terrorism is the purpose of this group of amendments. I hope that my right hon. Friend will be able to reassure us on the matter later so that we can discuss such issues in more detail on Report.