Terrorism Bill

I shall keep my remarks brief, because I know that other hon. Members wish to speak. My point goes back to my exchange with the Home Secretary. We hear now that the Attorney-General provided the basis on which the certificate of compatibility was granted. In the past, we have had opinions from the Attorney-General, but this matter is so important that we should be told on what basis the certificate of compatibility has been given. Lord Carlile of Berriew made a general point about whether the provisions would be challenged under the Human Rights Act 1998, but I believe strongly that any limit above 14 days would run a severe risk of being so challenged. Whether I agree with that upper limit or not, such a challenge is likely to be made. Such a challenge could come in various shapes or forms, and I wish to know what the Attorney-General had to say on that. In particular, did he consider the possibility of a challenge not only under article 5—which is frequently mentioned and concerns deprivation of liberty—but article 3, some of which can be subject to derogation and some of which cannot? Did he consider article 10, which deals with freedom of expression? I could mention other counts on which a challenge could be made to the provisions of the Bill as it stands and any limit above 14 days is liable to be subject to such a challenge. Chaos would result if the legislation were struck down, as the Belmarsh decision struck down the compatibility provisions in previous legislation. Lord Hoffmann, and eight out of nine Law Lords, spoke with great vehemence about the need to reverse the previous decision on the Belmarsh case on the ground of incompatibility. Only a short time earlier, Lord Hoffmann said in another case that, legislation, if clear and unambiguous, would be constitutionally acceptable even if it were inconsistent with the Human Rights Act 1998 and that the courts would have to follow the later legislation. Irrespective of what the Home Secretary has said, if the Bill were to include the words suggested in my amendment that"““this Act shall take effect notwithstanding the Human Rights Act 1998””," the judges would be under an obligation to give effect to the legislation irrespective of what the European convention on human rights said and irrespective of the HRA. I appreciate that, in the past few months, the Home Secretary and the Prime Minister—and my right hon. Friends the Member for Haltemprice and Howden (David Davis) and the Leader of the Opposition—have all stated that, if necessary, they would repeal or amend the Human Rights Act 1998. That was actually in our manifesto. This is a practical example in which such considerations come into play. I wish to know whether the Home Secretary will keep open the idea of amending the Bill in the way that I have described, because only that will ensure that the provisions will stand up—if a time limit over 14 days is imposed—and will not be successfully challenged. This is a serious matter. A huge amount of time and effort has been put into the proposals and it would be a waste if they were struck down by the Law Lords in such circumstances as I have described. It would also expose the British public to considerable danger because, in the years that would elapse, it would be likely that people who should be detained would get away.