I shall come to that in a moment, but for now I want to endorse what has been said by my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) and by the spokesman for the Liberal Democrats, among others. I agree that it is completely unacceptable that a person could commit the proposed offence merely through carelessness or negligence. If it is judged that there is reasonable cause to believe that a member of the public might feel a bit encouraged by something that is said to him or her, that amounts to what I suppose that we are meant to regard as a serious criminal offence.
That is completely unacceptable, and the proposal should never have been presented to the House. For me, the strongest point in the discussion about clause 1 is that the intention to incite terrorism must be the minimum requirement in an offence of indirect incitement. The role of intention is fundamental in the creation of an offence of that kind. If intention were necessary, it would explain why the provision is not otiose because it would provide an alternative form of words to those already on the statute book. I would accept that it should be an offence for someone to intend to incite someone else to act in preparation for or commission of terrorism. As it is, I think that that is already covered, but I would not object to the provision. I would regard that as a grave offence and it should carry heavy penalties, unless it is part of some absurd drunken outburst, but the provision would touch on all sorts of forms of words and mean that all kinds of literature, speeches or stray remarks could be seen as encouraging preparation for terrorism if some member of the public happened to hear them and was affected in that way. That is unacceptable.
When we have put such points to Ministers, the response has been—as my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg) just pointed out—““Ah, but the Attorney-General would not prosecute.”” In many cases, this House rightly passes laws, but because we know that the law might be exploited and ridiculous litigation might result—because people with particular interests might use it against their rivals in some political or religious dispute—we make it a condition that the Attorney-General, as a Law Officer of the Crown, is the only person who can bring a conviction. That removes the abuse of the threat of prosecution and the Attorney-General can ensure that a prosecution would involve a serious issue of public policy before it is brought. However, I have never known that practice to be taken to the lengths to which it is taken in the Bill. The need for the Attorney-General’s approval should not be used to try to rescue a uselessly drafted piece of legislation that might criminalise works of literature. The examples already given have illustrated the absurdity of the clause. It should not be an answer to say, ““Well, of course, all kinds of extraordinary things might be made unlawful by the Bill, but let us just pass this catch-all legislation and rely on the wise Attorney-General to ensure that only serious criminals face prosecution.”” I strongly urge against such an approach to legislation.
Throughout today, we should apply the test that the Government have applied when exhorting us all not to be soft on terrorism and to pass various other aspects of this legislation. If we are all fearful of the increased risk of terrorism—I suspect that we will face it for many years to come—we should ask of the proposals whether any sensible person would feel any safer if they were passed. That is the right test, and I would advise the most nervous of my fellow citizens, who lie awake at night worrying about the threat of terrorism, that they should not be deceived into thinking that clause 1 would make the slightest difference to their predicament. It is ridiculous and absurd, and it should never have been brought before us.
The Bill has been dragged together to give the impression of a dynamic and tough Government who are taking firm action in response to the recent outrages. If all they can produce to demonstrate firm action is this absurd legislation, the House has a duty to throw it out. If the Government begin the four days of proceedings on the Bill by defending such a provision, I fear what they will say when it comes to other significant elements within it.
Terrorism Bill
Proceeding contribution from
Lord Clarke of Nottingham
(Conservative)
in the House of Commons on Wednesday, 2 November 2005.
It occurred during Debate on bills
and
Committee of the Whole House (HC) on Terrorism Bill.
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Proceeding contribution
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438 c857-9 
Session
2005-06
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2024-09-24 15:58:51 +0100
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