Terrorism Bill

If I can employ a well-known legal term, the answer that the hon. Gentleman has been getting is absolute rot. There is an abundance of weapons in the prosecutor’s quiver to deal with that. Why Bakri in particular has not been prosecuted, and why those acts have not been prosecuted under the incitement provisions, is a matter of complete bemusement to me. Yet we are told that we have to wait because we need a new law. The amendments tabled by me and others would go a considerable way to redressing the matter, as they introduce into the Bill an element of intention. Intention is well known in the law—juries deal with it all the time. As to how one proves it or gets inside a man’s head, it is simple—one listens to what he says and the context in which he says it. One then says that, in those contexts, he manifestly intended to ferment terrorism or terrorist acts. That is not difficult, and I cannot understand for a moment why the Home Secretary will not accept it, particularly as it is already enshrined within European jurisprudence. In the circumstances, the next of our amendments is less important. Why should we not replace ““encouragement or other inducement”” with ““incitement””? I would like the Minister to answer, on the basis of heads, pins and angels, what is the difference between encouragement or other inducement and incitement? The Government tell us that the purpose of the Bill is to create indirect incitement as an offence, so why not use the words ““indirect incitement”” instead of indulging in encouragement and inducement? While we are on semantics, the next amendment is to remove completely the odious glorification provision. At least we no longer have ““exaltation”” as well—no doubt that is a favourite word of the Prime Minister’s, but it has disappeared. Such semantics and verbiage might be appropriate to Frederick Handel or William Blake, but they have no place whatever in the sterile world of criminal jurisprudence. We might glorify God, but we do not glorify what men do, and nor do we exalt it. Those words have no place in criminal jurisprudence, and should be expunged from it immediately. This is, in truth, the worst part of the Bill. Most of the media interest has centred on the three-month period, which is itself an affront, but this is the worst part. The three-month period can be changed at the drop of a hat, but once this provision is on the statute book we will let loose into criminal law something that all of us, in the course of our lives, will have cause profoundly to regret. I urge the Committee to join my colleagues and me in pressing amendment No. 79 to a Division in due course.