Terrorism Bill

I accept that point, but the Minister seemed to hint that if we introduce a recklessness test, as defined by the House of Lords in R v. G, it would present insurmountable obstacles to prosecution and that all sorts of unsavoury people who had said things that they should not would get off. I do not accept that argument: when a defendant goes into the witness box and says, ““I acted honestly when I walked out of the shop with the goods under my arm. It was all a mistake,”” juries have no difficulty in examining the circumstances and saying, ““Actually, you were dishonest, and that is a crime of specific intent.”” One can still be convicted under the subjective test. All that needs to be shown is that the defendant must have foreseen a risk in the course of carrying out a particular activity. It is even easier to convict under the subjective test, so I do not accept that it will lead to people whom the Government want to criminalise being acquitted. Consider the example of a foreign preacher who does not know much about life in Britain and who has come over on a visit. If he said, first, ““I never intended to incite terrorism,”” and secondly, ““I never foresaw that there was a risk of inciting terrorism,”” the jury could say, ““Although we see those words as incitement, we understand that he is telling the truth.”” The question is this: if the person is telling the truth about it, is it right that he should be landed with a criminal conviction? That is why I propose, unless I am persuaded otherwise, to vote with some reluctance against amendment No. 34 and invite the House to vote on my amendment, which has exactly the same wording except that it leaves out subsection (1A), which does all the mischief. However, I am conscious that other amendments would have a similar outcome, and I shall listen carefully to what Members say about them.