Terrorism Bill

I remember our discussion in Committee. I think that the response that I gave to the hon. Gentleman then still stands. If an actual danger had to be proved, it would set the threshold too high and the prosecution would find it difficult to bring a case. We are trying to get the balance right so that we can use the legislation to prosecute people who are causing a real problem in this country, yet ensure that we do not inadvertently bring people into the net who quite properly should be allowed to say the things that they want to say. That is at the heart of the Bill—we are trying to get the right balance between the correct security measures and the protection of liberty and freedom of speech. I am trying to draw that balance correctly without erring in favour of either priority. I do not want the Bill to be a piece of legislation under which people can still say those things with impunity because they are clever enough to formulate their words knowing that they will have an effect on other people but that they will escape prosecution themselves. It is not in the interests of anyone in this country to allow that situation to continue. Most of the remaining Government amendments in this group are consequential, as the meat of the argument is contained in Government amendment No. 34. We have found a formulation that works, and I hope that it will be accepted by all hon. Members. Amendments Nos. 19, 14, 2 and 21 would all have the same effect. Instead of allowing a recklessness test that would cover individuals who could not reasonably have failed to realise the likely effect of their actions, they limit the offence to people who intend or can be shown to have known the likely effect of their actions. As I said, that recklessness test is subjective, as opposed to objective. I have received advice that the formulation in subsection (1A) of amendment No. 34 is drafted to reflect the Caldwell case. The hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) will know more about that than I do, but it is right to include such a test. If we simply used a subjective test, individuals who brazenly encourage terrorism would be able to argue, despite the fact that they could not reasonably have failed to understand the likely effect of their comments, that they did not foresee the risk that members of their audience would be encouraged to commit acts of terrorism. The difference between that subjective test and the test in the Government amendments is crucial to the success of the legislation. Without an objective test, people could simply say that they did not intend their words to have a particular effect on their audience, and that they did not have any idea what would happen. We all know of individuals who have made such statements, but we have found it impossible to prosecute them. We want to make sure, however, that we can do so in future. We have tightened the provisions in clause 1 considerably, but we have preserved the integrity of the offence so that the measure is effective. Briefly, Government amendments Nos. 49 and 50 deal with a minor but important matter. Clause 18 provides that, if a corporate body is guilty of an offence under part 1, a senior officer of that body is also guilty. Originally, his connivance, consent or neglect was required, but hon. Members expressed concerns about an offence committed by negligence. As a result, the Government amendments tighten the provision and remove the neglect limb, so I hope that they will be welcomed by Members on both sides of the House.