Terrorism Bill

I am only sorry that this debate is not as much of a draw as the main attraction earlier, but I will do my best to make it as interesting as possible. The amendments build on some of the concepts that were contained in the amendments tabled in Committee by the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (David Davis) and his hon. Friends. As the House will recall, we had quite a lengthy debate in Committee on the issue of intent and, more particularly, how we ensure that the offence of encouragement to terrorism in clause 1 of the Bill is workable—which is what I said I wanted it to be—but does not cast its net unduly wide. I undertook to examine that issue further because I wanted to ensure that we did not catch people who clearly were not in any way intending to encourage others to commit acts of terrorism. We have gone back to the drawing board and come up with a formulation that we hope meets those objectives. The key amendment in this group is amendment No. 34, which replaces the existing clause 1(1). It provides that the offence in clause 1 can be committed in only two circumstances. Both of those circumstances were contained in amendments that we discussed last week, so the concepts have already been properly explored. The first set of circumstances is where a person makes or publishes a statement and intends it to be understood by its audience as an encouragement to carry out acts of terrorism. I do not think that anyone could object to that being a criminal offence, and we have put the word ““intends”” on the face of the Bill so there is complete clarity about the conduct that is meant. The second set of circumstances is where a person makes or publishes a statement and is reckless as to whether or not it is likely to be understood by his or her audience as an encouragement to carry out acts of terrorism. Again, for clarity, we have put the word ““reckless”” on the face of the Bill, and that was a word drawn from Opposition amendments in Committee. We have also defined ““reckless”” for these purposes as being a case where the person could not reasonably have failed to have been aware of the consequences of his action. Again, I am sure that no one could object to this provision. If an individual makes a statement encouraging others to commit an act of terrorism and could not reasonably have failed to realise the likely consequences of his actions, that should clearly be an offence.